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Public outrage at the enormous bonuses TARP recipients paid to senior executives
recently prompted the Obama administration to impose sweeping new curbs on
executive compensation. Shortly thereafter, Senator Dodd added restrictions on
executive bonuses to the stimulus bill President Obama subsequently signed. These are
understandable political reactions, but will they achieve the twin goals of reducing
executive compensation in recipients of federal assistance while spurring better
corporate performance? To examine this question, I analyze excessive compensation
as the product of "confident uncertainty, "the tendency of even the most sophisticated
actors to place unwarranted confidence in their ability to predict the future. In
particular, research from psychology and behavioral law and economics argues that
employers demonstrate misplaced faith in their ability to distinguish among closely
comparable candidates and therefore vastly overpay for talent which is not
predictably superior. I apply confident uncertainty to explain why corporations may
t Copyright © 2010 Michael B. Dorff.
* Associate Dean for Research and Irwin R. Buchalter Professor of Law, Southwestern
Law School; J.D. Harvard Law School, magna cum laude, A.B., Harvard College. This Article
has benefited greatly from the helpful comments and suggestions of David Fagundes, Kim
Ferzan, Bryant Garth, Warren Grimes, Russell Korobkin, Jim Kushner, Austen Parrish, Gowri
Ramachandran, Angela Riley, Lynn Stout, and the participants in the UCLA Law School
Faculty Workshop, the Santa Clara Law School Faculty Workshop, and the Southwestern Law
School Faculty Workshop. I am also grateful to Karen Hallock, Bayan Laird, Ruchira "Piya"
Mukherjee, and Melissa Wetkowski for their helpful research assistance.
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
pay their senior executives too much. These insights on the root causes of excessive
compensation grant valuable insight into the likely impact of both the Obama Plan
and the Dodd provisions. I argue the Obama Plan's cap on pay is likely to prove
effective in countering cognitive uncertainty, but it should be tailored to a
corporation's particular circumstance and apply to performance pay as well. I also
contend the nonbinding "say on pay "provisions in both the Obama Plan and Dodd
provisions are unlikely to curb excessive pay. Finally, I conclude that the Dodd
provisions' cap on performance pay are a step in the right direction, but contain
loopholes likely to seriously dilute any predicted benefit.
INTRODUCTION
Troubled financial companies paid their senior executives billions of dollars in
bonuses this past year.' When news of these bonuses broke, the resulting public
outrage prompted the Obama administration to proclaim sweeping new restrictions on
executive pay in early February. 2 Less than two weeks later, Senator Dodd added
provisions to the conference version of the stimulus bill-since signed by President
Obama-with additional compensation curbs.3 Both sets of limits included
revolutionary new provisions, including a fixed cap on senior-executive pay of
$500,000 in the Obama Plan, a ceiling on bonuses of one-third oftotal compensation in
the Dodd provisions, and a mandatory (though nonbinding) "say on pay" for
shareholders in both sets.
4
These restrictions represent an understandable political reaction. The specter of blue
chip financial companies requesting billions of dollars of public assistance while
simultaneously richly rewarding their senior executives seems almost calculated to
provoke the public's ire.5 Critics, however, have argued that Wall Street's system of
1. See Thomas Frank, The Tilting Yard: Wall Street Bonuses Are an Outrage, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 4, 2009, at Al l (illustrating that Wall Street paid $18.4 billion in bonuses in 2008, causing
a public outcry); Aaron Lucchetti & Matthew Karnitschnig, On Street, New Reality on Pay Sets
In, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2009, at BI (noting that the five biggest Wall Street firms lost a
combined $25.3 billion in 2008, yet paid out some $26 billion in bonuses); Aaron Lucchetti,
Deborah Solomon & Laura Meckler, Strict Executive-Pay Caps Planned, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4,
2009, at A3 ("Last week, Mr. Obama called it 'shameful' that Wall Street firms awarded $20
billion worth of bonuses as taxpayers were bailing them out ... ").
2. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions
on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg 15.htm.
3. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (2009).
4. See id; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2.
5. See Randall Smith, Aaron Lucchetti & Susanne Craig, Securities Firms Tackle Pay
Issue: Limits on Compensation Are Considered to Head Off a Public Outcry, WALL ST. J., Oct.
31, 2008, at CI (citing "an emerging consensus among some of the securities industry's most
powerful executives that the escalating pay controversy is creating yet another public-relations
mess for Wall Street"); Cari Tuna, Shareholders to Focus on Executive Compensation: Some
Investors, Frustrated with Big Payouts amid Financial Crisis, Plan to Propose Limits at Annual
Meetings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2009, at B4 (noting that many shareholders pushing to limit




performance bonuses are an efficient method of inspiring success, and eliminating
them could have the perverse effect of lengthening the recession.
6
This argument represents the latest and most intense bout in a long-standing debate
on whether corporate executives are paid efficiently.7 Many scholars have pointed to
6. See Roy C. Smith, Greed is Good, WALL ST. J., February 7,2009, at WI ("The capital-
markets industry operates in a very sophisticated and competitive environment, one that
responds best to strong performance incentives."); Carly Fiorina, Commentary: Government
Shouldn't Decide Executive Pay, CNN.coM, Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/
POLITICS/02/05/fiorina.pay/index.html ("[lit doesn't strengthen our economy when
government decides how much each job is worth. In America we leave that job to markets.").
7. For critics of the current system, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 27-31, 61-86 (2004)
(arguing that public company boards are dominated by CEOs and therefore pay their CEOs
excessive and poorly structured compensation); DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: How
EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS AMERICA 95-114 (1993)
(arguing that chief executives are overpaid); George P. Baker, Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
Murphy, Compensation andIncentives: Practice vs. Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593,614 (1988) (arguing
that directors fail to create proper executive pay arrangements); Linda J. Barris, The
Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J.
59, 61 (1992) (arguing that executive compensation is excessive); Carl T. Bogus, Excessive
Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 39
(1993) (applying the law of small group dynamics to the relationship between the board of
directors and the chief executive officer); Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh's Heart:
Harnessing Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries,
51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 825-26 (2003) (noting that the evidence does not support a link between
executive ability and compensation); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1489-93 (1989) (explaining that CEO compensation practices
do not align the interests of managers and shareholders); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO
Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 123, 145 (2000); Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: The American
Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 331
(1987) (arguing that board nominations by anyone other than management is "virtually
impossible"); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation (Apr. 1998),
http://ssm.com/abstract=163914 (reviewing the research on executive compensation); Robert
Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation Excessive?, in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE
AMERICA 276 (M. Bruce Johnson ed., 1978). For defenders of the market's fundamental
efficiency, see Steven M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tex. L. Rev.
1615, 1628-29 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUCK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFROMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 540 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259 (1982); Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum ofExecutive Compensation, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (arguing that CEOs are not overpaid); James A. Mirrlees, The
Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization, 7 BELL J. ECoN. 105
(1976); Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125 [hereinafter Murphy, Top Executives] (arguing that executive
compensation is not excessive); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The
Principal's Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and
Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979); Nicholas
Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959 (1980) (arguing that market
2010]
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indicia such as the rapid rise in executive pay, the ballooning multiples by which
executive compensation exceeds average worker compensation, and the disparity
between chief executive officer (CEO) pay in the United States and other developed
nations to argue that public company executives are paid too much. 8 Others have
focused instead on the executive-pay structure, arguing that the appearance of
performance-sensitive pay is really an illusion masking economic rents.9 Still other
scholars have defended the status quo as the product of an efficient labor market.1
0
It is not my purpose to engage this debate here or even to attempt to define what
constitutes "excessive" compensation. Instead, I begin with the assumption Congress
and the administration seem to have accepted: that executive pay is inefficient in
forces control executive compensation).
8. See, e.g., Barris, supra note 7, at 60-61 (noting that during the 1980s CEO
compensation increased by 212% while earnings on the S&P 500 Index grew by only 78% and
factory workers received only 53% raises); Bogus, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that during the
1980s, CEO compensation grew 212%); Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of
Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2027 (2007) (noting the multiples by
which CEO pay exceeds average workers has leaped from forty-two in the early 1980s to over
400 currently); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Compensation of the Chief Executive Officer and
Directors of Publicly Held Corporations, SE39 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 103, 106-08 (1999) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Compensation] (noting that while U.S. CEOs earn 200 times what factory workers
earn, Japanese CEOs earn only about twenty to thirty times factory workers' salaries); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, A Brief Overview of the Problems Raised by Executive and Director Compensation,
SC53 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 299, 301-02 (1997) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Overview] ("[T]he evidence
suggests that the total compensation of American CEOs, including base salary, bonus, long-term
compensation, and benefits and perquisites, is approximately twice as high as that of CEOs of
comparable corporations in Japan, Germany, eight other west European countries, and
Canada."); Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that from 1980-1995, average CEO pay
increased 380% while average worker salaries rose only 60%); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections
on Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposalfor (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201,
202-04 (1996) (highlighting a 1996 study showing that U.S. CEOs earned an average of
$1,085,000 while average CEOs in Great Britain earned $551,600, in Germany $537,000, in
France $485,004, and in Italy $318,000 and, U.S. CEO compensation rose 20.6% in 1993,
12.8% in 1994, and 10.4% in 1995); Perry & Zenner, supra note 7, at 123-24 (noting that the
total CEO compensation for all 1900 firms listed in the ExecuComp database more than doubled
from 1992 to 1998, and CEOs from S&P 500 firms' compensation rose more than 250%);
Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 Colum.
L. Rev. 1867, 1871 (1992) (book review) (noting that the in 1990, average U.S. CEOs earned
$2.8 million per year (120 times manufacturing worker's salary) while their counterparts in
Germany earned $735,000 annually (twenty-one times factory worker's compensation) and
CEOs in Japan earned only $310,000 (sixteen times factory worker's salary)).
9. By far the most prominent work in this area is BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7
(discussing the term "Managerial Power" and gathering voluminous evidence of a disconnect
between pay and performance in executive compensation).
10. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002); Easterbrook, supra note 7; Fischel, supra note 7;
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that CEOs are not overpaid); Mirrlees, supra note 7;
Murphy, Top Executives, supra note 7 (noting that executive compensation is not excessive);
Ross, supra note 7; Shavell, supra note 7; Thomas, supra note 7; Wolfson, supra note 7 (noting
that market forces control executive compensation).
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structure and excessive in amount." Given that assumption, how effective are the
Obama Plan and the Dodd provisions likely to prove in curbing excessive
compensation and improving executives' incentives to run their institutions efficiently?
Accurately predicting the likely impact of the new rules requires an understanding
of the root causes of excessive executive compensation. Previous attempts to explain
flaws in the executive-labor market have largely laid the blame at the door of
managers' ability to co-opt self-interested board members (the "managerial power"
theory).12 Such explanations stumble on two points. First, a large percentage of public-
company directors are current or former CEOs of other public companies, and
therefore have wealth and earning power that easily dwarfs the pay they receive for
their work as a director.' 3 It is therefore difficult to understand why they would
sacrifice their integrity for what is to them a relatively paltry sum. Second, even if the
incentives were significant, the managerial power theory assumes that most directors in
the United States have effectively accepted bribes to buy their complicity in a scheme
to enrich managers.' 4 The scale of this alleged conspiracy defies belief and does not
comport with our general assumptions of the board's good faith.' 5 For the managerial-
11. The Department of Treasury's press release provides, "[T]he compensation committees
of all companies receiving government assistance must provide an explanation of how their
senior-executive compensation arrangements do not encourage excessive and unnecessary risk-
taking." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2. The Obama Plan also states,
"[o]ver the last decade there has been an emerging consensus that top executives should receive
compensation that encourages more of a long-term perspective on creating economic value for
their shareholders and the economy at large." Id. Moreover, the Obama Plan calls for a
conference on executive pay reform at financial institutions. Id. Similarly, the Dodd provisions
require TARP recipients to exclude "incentives for senior executive officers ... to take
unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of such recipient." American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 11 l(b)(3)(A), 123 Stat. 115, 517 (2009).
Both plans provide for strict new limits on compensation, the Obama Plan on salaries and the
Dodd provisions on bonuses, reflecting a belief that market restraints are inadequate. See id.;
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2.
12. See BEBCHIUK & FRIED, supra note 7 (using the term "managerial power" and gathering
voluminous evidence of a disconnect between pay and performance in executive compensation).
Even some corporate law casebooks have adopted this position. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 156-57 (18th ed. 2000) (arguing that
because of constraints of time, information, and composition, boards largely defer to
management's decisions).
13. See BEBCHUK &FRIED, supra note 7, at 33 (noting that forty-one percent of directors on
compensation committees were executives in 2002, with an additional twenty-six percent retired
former executives); Dorff, supra note 8, at 2071 ("[Mlost board members are richly-paid
executives of other companies."); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875 (1991)
(noting that approximately 63% of public companies' outside directors are CEOs of other public
companies). The median pay for directors of the top two hundred corporations in the United
States was $190,000 in 2007. See PEARL MEYER & PARTNERS, 2007 DIRECTOR COMPENSATION
REPORT 4 (2007), http://www.pearlmeyer.com/knowledgecenter/research/director/
2007director.pdf.
14. See BEBcHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 30 ("Directors have a natural interest in their
own compensation, which CEOs may be able to influence.").
15. This presumption has been embodied in corporate law in the form of the highly
20101
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power theory to accurately describe corporate life requires most directors to have sold
their integrity for a song. While this is not impossible, Occam's razor suggests simpler
explanations are more likely to prove correct. Rather than assuming that most directors
are faithless rational calculating machines, the theory I advance in this Article takes the
more parsimonious view that they are merely human, with human judgment flaws.
Any such explanation must first confront a core belief in American law: that
sophisticated players make calculated, optimal decisions when faced with high-stakes
decisions.' 6 Human beings as a whole may often behave irrationally, but when the
consequences are great and there is a substantial incentive to make the correct decision,
highly educated and well-advised principals will behave efficiently. 17 This belief often
forms the basis of arguments favoring free, deregulated markets under the rationale that
sophisticated players can defend their own interests without law's supporting crutch. 18
Although widely accepted, this belief has not been adequately tested empirically. In
fact, the few empirical studies that have been conducted indicate that sophisticated
players may prove equally susceptible to the foibles of human decision making.19 And
certainly this past year's disastrous collapses in multiple markets-such as housing,
deferential business-judgment rule. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984),
overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) ("It is a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."); see also
Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006).
16. See, e.g., Beethoven.com L.L.C v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d 939,947 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (holding that the contract was particularly reliable because it involved sophisticated
market participants with substantial resources); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173,
191 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that institutional investors should be the lead plaintiff in securities
class actions because they have a large financial stake in the transaction and have the incentive
and the sophistication to monitor the litigation); In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326
F.3d 201, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting the fact that a settlement reached by sophisticated
parties with conflicting interests argues in favor of its fairness).
17. The Behavioral Law and Economics literature has provided numerous examples of
irrational human behavior. For the best overviews of this literature's insights see Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law andEconomics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000) and Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998).
18. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR
SECURITIES REGULATION 12 (2002) (noting that the federal securities laws are less meaningful
with the rise of sophisticated investors and available investor information on the Internet);
Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV.
279, 282-83 (2000) (arguing that sophisticated investors do not need regulation because they
can bargain for their own protections); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 544-45 (1999) (noting that there is no need to
change the "rely-at-your-own-risk" rule because those who rely are generally sophisticated
players).
19. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURsTIcs AND BIASES 3, 16-17 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (noting that there is an optimism bias in
estimating knowledge certainty common to both sophisticated and naive subjects); Amos
Tversky, Assessing Uncertainty, 36 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y 148, 151-52 (noting that even
experienced research psychologists demonstrated erroneous belief in the law of small numbers).
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credit, equities, and oil-should at least inspire some questioning of our implicit faith
in sophisticated market participants.
20
In this Article, I advance a behavioral-economics theory for why the most
intelligent, well-educated, wealthy business people are sometimes colossally wrong. I
argue that the interaction of several well-documented heuristics and biases causes even
the most sophisticated actors to place unwarranted confidence in their ability to predict
the future, a phenomenon I term "confident uncertainty." When we make predictions
about the future, we employ a number of heuristics that, while often useful, distort our
analysis of the gathered data.2 1 We wrongly assume that the sample we have is
representative of the real world, even when we have good reason to know that our
sample is flawed.22 We rely heavily on types of information that are poor predictors,
such as job interviews.23 We place too much faith in our ability to control random
20. See GMAC Posts a Profit for Fourth Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at B3
(describing the effects of the collapse of the credit industry on GMAC); Walter Hamilton, Dow
Hits a 6- Year Low, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at C l (noting that the Dow is down 47% from its
record high); Jack Healy, October Report Shows Home Prices Down 18%from Last Year, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at B3 (noting that the housing market was down 18%); Jack Healy,
Wholesale Costs Rise As Oil Prices Seem to Bottom Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at B3
("Crude oil has fallen from its peaks of about $145 a barrel in July as a global economic
downturn gained force, but prices have settled around $35 to $40 a barrel since mid-
December.").
21. See Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the
Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 19, at 129, 135 (noting that a fundamental attribution error
results from processes that function well in many contexts).
22. See Caryl Cox & John Mouw, Disruption of the Representativeness Heuristic: Can We
Be Perturbed into Using Probabilistic Reasoning?, 23 EDUC. STUD. MATHEMATICS 163 (1992);
David M. Grether, Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic, 95
Q.J. EcoN. 537 (1980); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment
ofRepresentativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note
19, at 32, 33.
23. See, e.g., EDWARD C. WEBSTER, THE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEW: A SOCIAL JUDGMENT
PROCESS (1982); Richard D. Arvey & James E. Campion, The Employment Interview: A
Summary and Review of Recent Research, 35 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 281 (1982); Michael M.
Harris, Reconsidering the Employment Interview: A Review of Recent Literature and
Suggestions for Future Research, 42 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 491 (1989) (indicating that the
interview has moderate validity); John E. Hunter & Ronda F. Hunter, Validity and Utility of
Alternative Predictors of Job Performance, 96 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72 (1984); Eugene C. Mayfield,
The Selection Interview-A Re-evaluation of Published Research I PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 239
(1964); G.G. Milne, The Interview: Let Us Have Perspective, 2 AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOLOGIST 77
(1967); Richard R. Reilly & Georgia T. Chao, Validity and Fairness of Some Alternative
Employee Selection Procedures, 35 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1 (1982); Alec Rodger, The
Worthwhileness of the Interview, 26 OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 101 (1952); Patricia M. Rowe,
The Employment Interview: A Valid Selection Procedure, 28 CANADIAN PERSONNEL & INDUS.
REL. J. 37 (1981); Neal Schmitt, Social and Situational Determinants of Interview Decisions:
Implications for the Employment Interview, 29 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 79 (1976); Lynn Ulrich &
Don Trumbo, The Selection Interview Since 1949, 63 PSYCHOL. BULL. 100 (1965); Ralph
Wagner, The Employment Interview: A Critical Summary, 2 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 17 (1949);
Orman R. Wright, Summary ofResearch on the Selection Interview Since 1964, 22 PERSONNEL
2010]
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events.24 When we make decisions in groups, we are likely to defer to the will of the
majority or the group's leader and avoid raising issues that may generate conflict, such
as alternative proposals.2
Heuristics and biases like these interact to produce flawed choices. Then, once we
have made and invested in such a decision, cognitive dissonance encourages us to
interpret new data in a way that reinforces the accuracy of our original choice and
urges us to defend the original outcome rather than correct our prior errors.2 6 The
anxiety associated with stressful and uncertain choices demands amelioration. Denying
that the choice was difficult can ease the mental pressure caused by uncertainty.
2 7
This strategy's corollary, however, is excessive confidence in the judgment's
accuracy. High confidence in turn can induce decision makers to defend the outcome
too vigorously, by overpaying for the anointed candidate or by punishing those who
threaten the legitimacy of the decision-making process.28 We persuade ourselves the
decision was easy because one candidate or process was clearly superior to the
competition. An outstanding candidate is worth pursuing at even a premium price, and
a worthwhile process is worth defending vigorously from detractors.
In sum, I argue confident uncertainty causes those responsible for choosing key
employees to use methods in which they place undeserving confidence, leading to
distortions in employment markets and undue resistance to reform. To support my
claim, I first introduce the heuristics and biases that make up confident uncertainty
(Part I). In Part II, I proceed to apply confident-uncertainty analysis to corporate senior
executives. Again beginning with the (contested) assumption that senior executives are
paid too much, I explain why corporate boards may systematically err in making
compensation decisions. Finally, Part III evaluates the Obama administration's current
proposal to regulate executive compensation in light of confident uncertainty's
insights, as well as the executive-compensation provisions Senator Dodd subsequently
inserted in the stimulus package and the Treasury regulations authorized by those
PSYCHOL. 391 (1969). But see Michael A. McDaniel, Deborah L. Whetzel, Frank L. Schmidt &
Steven D. Maurer, The Validity of Employment Interviews: A Comprehensive Review and Meta-
Analysis, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 599, 610 (1994) (noting that even an unstructured interview
has a "respectable" level of validity); Willi H. Wiesner & Steven F. Cronshaw, A Meta-Analytic
Investigation of the Impact of Interview Format and Degree of Structure on the Validity of the
Employment Interview, 61 J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 275, 286, 289 (1988) (noting that
interviews have satisfactory to modest validity, depending on the type of interview, and produce
better results than random selection).
24. See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 19, at 231, 237-38.
25. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES (2d ed., 1982); Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate
Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 496-97 (1999).
26. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNrrVE DISSONANCE (1957); see also C. Daniel
Batson, Rational Processing or Rationalization?: The Effect ofDisconfirming Information on a
Stated Religious Belief 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 176 (1975) [hereinafter Batson,
Rational Processing]; C. Daniel Batson, Experimentation in Psychology of Religion: An
Impossible Dream, 16 J. Sci. STUDY RELIGION 413, 416 (1977) [hereinafter Batson, Psychology
of Religion].
27. See FESTINGER, supra note 26, at 34, 42-46.
28. See infra Part ll.B.
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provisions. 29 1 conclude that caps on compensation are advisable so long as they are
tailored caps-not uniform caps as the Obama plan currently provides.30 The unlimited
performance pay in the Obama plan, however, is likely to unwind the cap's benefits,
and the nonbinding "say on pay" will do little to curb excessive compensation.31 The
Dodd provisions' bonus restrictions could be a useful step, but they fail to provide
meaningful limits on total pay and contain a troubling loophole for preexisting




Most of us would have little trouble admitting we cannot predict the future.
Foretelling events is generally relegated to the realm of fantasy or science fiction.
Although there are thousands of mediums and spiritualists that claim prophetic
powers,34 and even respected public figures are sometimes rumored to consult
psychics, 35 few people will publicly admit to taking precognitive abilities seriously. Yet
we have implicit faith that sophisticated business people can and will make efficient
economic decisions. These choices necessarily rely on forecasts, whether about
demand for a new product, fashion trends, development of new technologies, or
general economic conditions. As such, these decisions should be made cautiously,
remaining sensitive to their contingent nature and attempting to provide for unforeseen
occurrences. All too often, though, sophisticated market participants forget or suppress
the uncertainty that accompanies planning, sometimes with ruinous results.
Why? Decision makers with the resources to acquire the best advice and the most
advanced statistical expertise, should not overestimate the extent of their knowledge.
Nevertheless, as I shall explore below, time and again they do.36 I argue that this
29. See Deborah Solomon & Mark Maremont, Bankers Face Strict New Pay Cap: Stimulus
Bill Puts Retroactive Curb on Bailout Recipients; Wall Street Fumes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14,
2009, at Al (noting that the stimulus package passed by Congress includes new executive-
compensation restrictions inserted by Senator Dodd).
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra Parts III.C-D.
32. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
11 l(b)(3)(D)(iii), 123 Stat. 115, 518 (2009) ("The prohibition [on bonuses] shall not be
construed to prohibit any bonus payment required to be paid pursuant to a written employment
contract executed on or before February 11, 2009 ....
33. See infra Part III.E.
34. Yellow.com lists over six thousand businesses under the category "psychics and
mediums." See Yellow Pages, http://yellowpages.superpages.com/listings.jsp?SRC=
comwp&CS=L&MCBPtrue&C=psychic&STYPE=S&L=&search.x=69&search.y=8&search=
Find+It&search=Find+It.
35. Hillary Clinton and Nancy Reagan, for example, both are rumored to have consulted
with psychics. See Greg Barrett, Can the Living Talk to the Dead?, USA TODAY, July 20,2001,
at D 1; John Podhoretz, Clinton Fatigue for Dems; It's Why Hillary Can't Get a Real Cheer
Even from Her Own Party, N.Y. PoST, Feb. 8, 2000, at 43; Nancy Benac, Watergate: How a
"Third-Rate Burglary" Changed American History, L.A. TIMEs, June 8, 1997, at 31.
36. See infra Parts I-II.
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surprising result stems from a confluence ofwell-documented heuristics and biases that
interact to produce excessive confidence about forecasts.
Our problems fall broadly into three categories: perception, analysis, and group
decision making. In gathering data, we tend to seek reassurance in consistency and
assume the relevance of data that is not very probative. 37 That is, we suffer from an
illusion that comforting data is also valid, even when it is not. We also often incorrectly
assume that the sample we have (or can easily recall) is representative of the entire
population and tend to believe success is entirely the result of skill-employing a
representativeness heuristic.
3 s
When we analyze the data, we act as though we believe we can influence future
events, underestimating the role of chance.39 Also, we interpret new data to confirm our
preexisting theories, even when the new data tends to undermine our presuppositions.4
Confronting the new data's impact threatens us with unpleasant cognitive dissonance,
which we avoid by interpreting the new data as consistent with our theories or
discounting the new information altogether.41 To make matters worse, we are generally
far too optimistic about our conclusions' validity and our own skills generally.
42
Finally, when we gather together to make decisions, we have a tendency to self-
censor dissenting views and to defer to the group's leader or to the majority, resulting
in groupthink.43 We are also susceptible to social cascades, in which we mimic the
majority's strategy, ignoring our private information."
All of these problems combine to inspire excessive confidence in our ability to
predict the future. In this section, I shall describe the various heuristics and biases that
together create confident uncertainty.
37. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology ofPrediction, 80 PSYCHOL.
REV. 237 (1973) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology of Prediction]; Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 19, at 9 (describing the illusion of validity).
38. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 33; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES, supra note 19, at 84, 84-85 [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Representativeness].
39. See Langer, supra note 24, at 231.
40. See FESTINGER, supra note 26, at 44-46; Ross & Anderson, supra note 21, at 144.
41. See Ross & Anderson, supra note 21, at 151.
42. See Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENTUNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEuRisTIcs AND
BIASES, supra note 19, at 422, 432.
43. See generally JANIS, supra note 25; Forbes & Milliken, supra note 25.
44. Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Classroom Games: Information Cascades, 10 J.
ECON. PERSP. 187 (1996) [hereinafter Anderson & Holt, Classroom Games]; see also Lisa R.
Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 847
(1997) [hereinafter Anderson & Hold, Information Cascades]; Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple
Model of Herd Behavior, 108 Q.J. ECON. 797, 798 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani, David
Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and
Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 154 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative




The first set of heuristics affects our decisions by biasing the information we receive
and process. Two dynamics are important here: the illusion of validity and the
representativeness heuristic.
1. The Illusion of Validity
Not all information is equally informative. Some types of data are clearly irrelevant,
but other irrelevant data may be more seductive. A good fit between the predicted
outcome and the gathered data can produce too much confidence that the prediction
will come true.45 Confidence is in part a function of the data's internal consistency, but
consistency does not actually enhance a prediction's validity.46 In fact, the opposite is
often the case. Given a set number of variables, it is preferable to have variables that
are independent of one another.47 Variables dependent on the same factors produce less
information-and less predictive power-than do independent variables. 4' But
independent variables more often produce inconsistent information, reducing
confidence. Variables that contain overlapping information boost confidence without
enhancing real predictive power. 49
For example, in hiring an associate, a law firm may take comfort in observing that
the candidate had an impressive law school record and clerked for a prestigious judge.
These two variables reinforce one another, building the perception that the candidate's
accomplishments merit the position. The two variables, however, are interdependent.
The reason the candidate was able to clerk for a prestigious judge was that he or she
45. See Hillel J. Einhom & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: The Persistence of
the Illusion of Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REv. 395,396 (1978) (noting that experience can enhance
the illusion of validity through confirmatory bias); A.V. Muthukrishnan, Decision Ambiguity
and Incumbent Brand Advantage, 22 J. CONsUMER REs. 98, 99-100 (1995); Robert Prentice,
Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its
Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1463 n.307 (2002) ("[P]eople will be confident in the prediction
that a person is a librarian when a description of that person matches a stereotype of a librarian,
even if the information contained in the description is scanty, unreliable, or outdated."); Susanna
Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in
Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 929, 960 (2005) (noting that the
illusion of validity causes people making judgments under uncertainty to experience excessive
confidence in fallible choices); Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics andBiases, supra note 19, at 9
(describing the illusion of validity).
46. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 9 ("The unwarranted confidence which is
produced by a good fit between the predicted outcome and the input information may be called
the illusion of validity.").
47. See id. ("[A]n elementary result in the statistics of correlation asserts that, given input
variables of stated validity, a prediction based on several such inputs can achieve higher
accuracy when they are independent of each other than when they are redundant or correlated.").
48. See id. ("[R]edundancy among inputs decreases accuracy even as it increases
confidence, and people are often confident in predictions that are quite likely to be off the
mark.").
49. See id. ("The internal consistency of a pattern of inputs is a major determinant of one's
confidence in predictions based on these inputs.").
2010]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
performed well as a law student. Strong school work resulted in obtaining a fine
clerkship. The second variable-the clerkship post-therefore adds little information
but nevertheless may disproportionately boost confidence.5 0 As pioneering behavioral
economists Kahneman and Tversky have written, "[R]edundancy among inputs
decreases accuracy even as it increases confidence, and people are often confident in
predictions that are quite likely to be off the mark. ' 1
One interesting effect of the illusion of validity is its tendency to enforce folk
wisdom and stereotypes. So, for example, in studies in which subjects are given a
description of a person that matches a librarian's stereotype-that is, quiet, bookish,
wears glasses-the subjects express confidence that the person described is a
librarian.5 2 Their confidence remains unabated even when the description is very
limited or when the description was written many years before (and might therefore no
longer reflect the person's character).,3 Their emotional state reflects the illusion that
the little information they have received validly predicts the person's profession.
The illusion of validity induces overconfidence in the face of uncertainty by
cloaking irrelevant (or at least not very relevant) data in the guise of predictive
information. Decision makers then inappropriately treat the immaterial information as
though it forecasts accurately, producing confident but erroneous visions of the future
that inspire suboptimal decisions.
2. The Representativeness Heuristic
Suppose we have two events, A and B, and we wish to explore how the two are
related. That process could be quite difficult and involved, perhaps requiring a detailed
analysis of the root causes of A and B, their relative frequencies, and any possible
environmental influences on both or either. The representativeness heuristic provides a
shortcut to resolve this problem. When we use the representativeness heuristic, we
judge the probability that A caused B by evaluating the similarities between A and B.
If the two events seem alike, we judge the probability that one caused the other as
relatively high. If they seem dissimilar, we judge the causation probability less likely.
Although this heuristic may be useful, it also leads to three important structural
errors. First, representativeness may persuade us to believe falsely in the law of small
numbers.5 4 Second, judging events by their resemblance to one another may cause us to
believe in a relationship because the story seems plausible, when the level of detail that
makes a story believable actually makes it less probable.5 5 Finally, judging whether one
50. Some might argue that the clerkship provides some training that could be relevant to the
applicant's future career. Clerking likely does help prepare future litigators, but it seems
unlikely that clerks receive much training in scholarship or teaching.
51. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 9.
52. Id.; Prentice, supra note 45, at 1463 n.307 ("[P]eople will be confident in the prediction
that a person is a librarian when a description of that person matches a stereotype of a librarian,
even if the information contained in the description is scanty, unreliable, or outdated.").
53. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 9.
54. See Tversky & Kalmeman, Representativeness, supra note 38, at 83-84.
55. Id. at 98.
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event is likely to cause another by the events' similarity may cause us to overlook the
more probative basal-probability rates.
56
Very large random samples are generally quite representative of their base
populations.57 The same cannot be said, however, for small samples.58 Small samples
permit enormous variance, so that the sample may not provide much information about
the population as a whole.59 The representativeness heuristic ignores this statistical
principle and treats small samples as though they were representative of the whole.
60
For example, in one study subjects were asked to estimate the distributions in the
heights of men selected randomly where the average height was 170 cm. 6' Their
estimates remained constant as the number of men in the group changed from 10 to 100
to 1000.62 The subjects were entirely insensitive to sample size. Statistics teaches us
that in fact the odds of obtaining an unusually large average height decline as the
sample size increases.63 When the sample size is small, there is a greater chance of
obtaining a result significantly different from the broader population than when the
sample size is large.64 The subjects ignored this rule and instead applied the
representativeness heuristic.
65
Another type of problem caused by the representativeness heuristic comes from our
focus on coherence.66 Data that fits a consistent account is more salient than
information that is harder to explain.67 We therefore have trouble taking in data that
makes the account less plausible. 68 Adding details to an account-which makes the
account statistically less likely, since more is being predicted-tends to increase
56. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 4-5.
57. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 22, at 35, 37-38. See generally Ward Edwards &
Detlof von Winterfeldt, On Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications, in JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 592,600-01 (Terry Connolly, Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 2d
ed. 2000).
58. See Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 57, at 600-01; Kahneman & Tversky,
supra note 22, at 35, 37-38.
59. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 22, at 35, 37-38.
60. See id. at 38.
61. See id. at 40-42; Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 57, at 600.
62. See Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 57, at 600.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 22, at 40. Another interesting study in this area
asked subjects which of two hospitals recorded more days on which more than sixty percent of
babies born that day were boys. The two hospitals were different sizes, with the larger hospital
averaging forty-five babies born per day and the smaller averaging only fifteen. Subjects
overwhelmingly said that the hospitals would record about the same number of days with an
unusual percentage of boys born, even though the odds are much higher that the smaller hospital
would have more such days than the larger. Id. at 44-46.
66. See Tversky & Kahneman, Representativeness, supra note 38, at 97-98.
67. See Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 19, at 190, 197-98.
68. Id. at 200.
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confidence in the account's validity, the opposite of the correct reaction. 69 A good
story is generally more believable than a poor story, but less likely.
70
Studies have verified this effect by examining subjects' judgments of the relative
probability of simple and compound statements. 71 For example, in one study, subjects
were given a short personality sketch and then asked to rank the likelihood of a series
of statements about the person described.72 Most of these statements were simple,
declarative sentences such as, "Linda is a bank teller" or, "Linda is active in the
feminist movement., 73 A few of the sentences were compound statements crafted by
combining two of the simple declarations such as, "Linda is a bank teller and is active
in the feminist movement."
74
The probability that a compound statement will be true is always lower than the
probability that either of its components will be true.75 Linda is more likely to be a
bank teller than she is to be a bank teller who is active in the feminist movement.
Nevertheless, subjects consistently ranked the compound statement as more likely than
at least one of its component parts.76 The compound statement created a more complete
and consistent image that subjects found more probable than the relatively truncated
descriptions in the simple statements.77 Subjects were drawn to the good stories.78
69. See Tversky & Kahneman, Representativeness, supra note 38, at 90-98.
70. See id. at 98. As Tversky & Kahneman wrote:
As they stare into the crystal ball, politicians, futurologists, and laypersons alike
seek an image of the future that best represents their model of the dynamics of the
present. This search leads to the construction of detailed scenarios, which are
internally coherent and highly representative of our model of the world. Such
scenarios often appear more likely than less detailed forecasts, which are in fact
more probable. As the amount of detail in a scenario increases, its probability can
only decrease steadily, but its representativeness and hence its apparent likelihood
may increase.
Id. at 97-98.
71. Id. at 90-97; see also Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of
Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1684 (2003) ("In one set of studies,
ninety-one percent of subjects, including those with substantive expertise, were induced by the
representativeness heuristic to commit the conjunction fallacy.").
72. See Tversky & Kahneman, Representativeness, supra note 38, at 90-97.
73. Id. at 92.
74. Id; see also Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral
Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 133, 158 (2000) (describing the
study).
75. See Paul Chevigny, Pornography and Cognition: A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 420,424 (1989) (describing the "basic probability" that a single characteristic is more likely
than a conjunctive characteristic); Tversky & Kahneman, Representativeness, supra note 38, at
90.
76. See Tversky & Kahneman, Representativeness, supra note 38, at 90-97; see also David
M. Frederick & Robert Libby, Expertise andAuditors'Judgments of Conjunctive Events, 24 J.
ACCT. REs. 270,281-88 (1986) (reporting studies demonstrating that even auditors employ the
representativeness heuristic).
77. See Prentice, supra note 74, at 158 ("The similarity of the description to the stereotype
of a feminist overwhelms the (seemingly) obvious point that it must be more likely that Linda is
only 'a' than that she is 'a' and 'b."' (emphasis in original)); Tversky & Kahneman,
Representativeness, supra note 38, at 90-98.
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This effect is so powerful that it can cause us to ignore information that does not fit
within our conceptual map.79 For example, one study presented psychology graduate
students with a paragraph supposedly written by a clinical psychologist about Tom,
now a graduate student. 80 The psychologist had based the evaluation on projective
tests conducted while Tom was in high school.81 The paragraph described Tom as
intelligent but uncreative and hungry for order.8 2 It also stated that Tom had little
feeling or sympathy for other people but did have a deep moral sense.
83
The graduate students ranked the probability that Tom had entered into nine
possible fields of graduate education. They strongly agreed that Tom's most likely
areas were computer science or engineering, and that he was least likely to have
entered social sciences, social work, the humanities, or education. They also agreed
that the kind of projective tests relied on by the psychologist in formulating the
descriptive paragraph did not provide a valid basis for predicting future career choices.
Afterwards, the subjects were told that Tom in fact was an education graduate student
specializing in the education of children with special needs. The students were then
asked to explain the relation between Tom's personality and career choice.
8 4
The graduate students believed that the psychologist's evaluation was based on
invalid testing. 5 Faced with an invalid test result from Tom's high school years and a
contrasting current career choice, the most sensible response would be to discount the
psychologist's evaluation and reevaluate Tom's personality in light of his actual career
86
as kinder and more caring than the psychologist believed. Instead, the students
explained Tom's career choice in terms of the psychologist's evaluation, arguing that it
stemmed either from his deep moral sense or a need for dominance. 7 Only a small
minority (twenty-one percent) questioned the validity of the study, and even most of
these explained Tom's profession as a function of the psychologist's view of Tom's
personality. 88 These responses illustrate both our reluctance to revise an explanatory
78. See Tversky & Kahneman, Representativeness, supra note 38, at 90-98.
79. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments Under
Uncertainty, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIsTICS AND BIASES, supra note 19, at 117,
126-28.
80. Id.; see also Charles L. Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1957, 1990
(2008).
81. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 79, at 127; see also Barzun, supra note 80, at 1990.
82. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 79, at 127.
83. Id.
84. See id. (describing experiment).
85. Id. at 127 ("Response to an additional question also exhibited general agreement that
projective tests do not provide a valid source of information for the prediction of professional
choice.").
86. As Tversky & Kahneman argued: "The high confidence with which people predict
professional choice from personality descriptions implies a belief in a high correlation between
personality and vocational choice. This belief, in turn, entails that professional choice is highly
diagnostic with respect to personality." Id.
87. Id.; see also Barzun, supra note 80, at 1990.
88. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 79, at 127-28; see also Barzun, supra note 80, at




model once adopted and our ability to use an existing model to account for new
nonconforming data.
89
Coherence encourages us to look for stories and to cling to them once we have
found them. We may have an explanation or theory in mind even before we begin to
examine the data. If the early data seems to confirm this theory, we are likely to insist
that later data that does not fit the theory is inaccurate or aberrational. Instead of fitting
the theory to the data, we are likely to try to conform the data to the theory with which
we started. This tendency also can make us overly optimistic about our projections. If
we have a good story about what has happened in the past and why, we may assume
that the story will continue to hold true in the future. Our affection for coherence may
disguise the data's true variability. As a result, we may overlook warning signs that the
future may be quite different from the past.
Finally, the representativeness heuristic may cause us to pay too little attention to
base-rate probabilities as we focus on the similarity between cause and potential
effects. 90 Representativeness information is easily available and may often prove
useful. Two variables that rise and fall together often are related in some way, either
with one causing the other or both the result of some third factor. But the heuristic fails
to take account of base-rate probabilities-the likelihood that an event A will occur
regardless of the presence of event B.9' In addition to encouraging belief in the law of
small numbers and prioritizing coherence, the representativeness heuristic induces us to
ignore the base-rate information we have about the population as a whole, such as the
overall frequency of event B.92
89. For other prominent studies that have reached similar conclusions see ROBERT JERVIS,
PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); Robert P. Abelson, Modes of Resolution of
Belief Dilemmas, 3 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 343 (1959); Carl I. Hovland, Reconciling Conflicting
Results Derived from Experimental and Survey Studies of Attitude Change, 14 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 8 (1959).
90. See Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology of Prediction, supra note 37, at 237-38;
Richard E. Nisbett, Eugene Borgida, Rick Crandall & Harvey Reed, Popular Induction:
Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES, supra note 19, at 101, 107-08; Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence
and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 545 (1989) ("People, as an empirical
matter, tend to underestimate the probative value of base-rate evidence in comparison to other
evidence.").
91. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 22 (2007) ("When people rely on the
representativeness heuristic .... [They] tend to discount information about the frequency with
which the underlying category occurs, a phenomenon known as 'base rate' neglect."); Jonathan
J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the
Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 256 (1990)
(giving an example of how people tend to underweigh base rate information).
92. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17, at 1086 ("The 'representativeness heuristic' refers
to the tendency of actors to ignore base rates and overestimate the correlation between what
something appears to be and what something actually is."); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES,
supra note 19, at 153, 153-54.
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One landmark study that illustrated this aspect of the representativeness heuristic
asked subjects to guess, based on a description, whether someone was a lawyer or an
engineer. 93 The subjects were told that the person described came from a group of one
hundred engineers and lawyers that were interviewed by a panel of psychologists. 94
The psychologists wrote thumbnail descriptions of each member of the group, based on
the interviews and some personality tests.95 Some subjects were told the group
consisted of thirty engineers and seventy lawyers (the "low-engineer" group), while
others were told the group consisted of seventy engineers and thirty lawyers (the "high-
engineer" group).96 When given no description at all, the subjects generally assessed
the probability that someone was an engineer at thirty percent in the low-engineer
group and seventy percent in the high-engineer group.97 But when the subjects were
given an uninformative description (thirty, married, motivated, able, and well liked),
they estimated the odds the described person was an engineer at around fifty percent.
That is, even useless information was sufficient to cause people to ignore the basal
probabilities and instead ground their estimate solely on their sense of the similarity
between the description and the two professions.
98
Base-rate probabilities are often an important predictor. Our experience of outdoor
weddings may exclusively consist of fair-weather events, such that we strongly
associate outdoor weddings with sunny days. Nevertheless, if it typically rains on half
of the days in May, we probably should not plan an outdoor May wedding. Ignoring
valid base-rate data in favor of invalid information about the similarity of potential
causes and effects (weddings are sunny) may cause us to become overly optimistic
about our forecasts.
Correlation does not necessarily prove causation. 99 When two events seem related-
when one seems representative of the other--our ability to separate correlation from
causation diminishes sharply. The more one event represents another, the greater our
93. See Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology of Prediction, supra note 37, at 241.
94. Id; see also Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior
with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1428 n.54 (1979)
(describing study).
95. Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology of Prediction, supra note 37, at 241; see also Jeffrey
O'Connell & Joseph R. Baldwin, (In)juries, (In)justice, and (l)legal Blame: Tort Law as
Melodrama-or Is It Farce?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 425, 435-36 (2002).
96. Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology of Prediction, supra note 37, at 241; see also Jeff
Sovem, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty
Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993
Wis. L. REv. 13, 34.
97. Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology of Prediction, supra note 37, at 242; see also Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 665 (1999).
98. Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology of Prediction, supra note 37, at 242-43; see also
Jonathan J. Koehler, When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?, 42 JURIMETRIcs
J. 373,396 (2002) ("It seems that individuating information reduces the perceived relevance of
base rates, whereas the absence of individuating information focuses attention on available base
rates." (emphasis in original)).
99. See 0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the Complexity of Capital Punishment, 82
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1265, 1287 (2007).
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tendency to assume a causal link between the two.' 00 The representativeness heuristic
thus tends to produce overly optimistic forecasts that similar events will follow one
another.
B. Analysis Issues
The second set of heuristics influences the way we analyze the data we have
gathered. Two evaluative phenomena act to render us unduly optimistic about our
ability to plan for and influence future events. First, we place undue confidence in our
ability to determine outcomes, understating chance's role.' 01 Second, we tend to
interpret data in order to support our own preconceptions, and may even ignore
information that contradicts a favored theory. 10 2 These phenomena combine to
inappropriately enhance our confidence in our capacity to manage uncertainty.
1. The Illusion of Control
A gambler steps up to the craps table. She needs a high number to win. How hard
should she throw the dice? This question may seem like a non sequitur. The fall of the
dice is random, and the number that comes up is not affected by the force with which
the dice are released. Despite this fact of physics, people throw the dice hard when they
want a high number and drop them softly when they want a low number.'
0 3
Ellen Langer has demonstrated that this perplexing behavior is the result of what she
terms the "illusion of control."' 1 4 Most tasks involve a mix of chance and skill. 0 5 It is
therefore often difficult to distinguish the relative roles of luck and talent. 106 As a
result, people behave as though they can control outcomes, even when those outcomes
are entirely random.'
0 7
One particularly telling study involved lottery tickets.10 8 Langer divided subjects
into two groups. One group was given lottery tickets ("assigned group"); the other
group was permitted to choose their own lottery tickets ("choice group"). 109 Then both
100. See Loren J. Chapman & Jean Chapman, Test Results Are What You Think They Are, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEuRIsncs AND BIASES, supra note 19, at 239, 241.
101. See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal
Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REv. 467, 475 (2008) ("Behavioral studies show that individuals
often believe that they can influence the likelihood of stochastic outcomes."); Langer, supra
note 24, at 231; Paul K. Presson & Victor A. Benassi, Illusion of Control: A Meta-Analytic
Review, 11 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERsoNALrrY 493 (1996) (reviewing the literature).
102. See FESTINGER, supra note 26; see also Batson, Rational Processing, supra note 26, at
176; Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 237, 270 (describing a study showing cognitive dissonance can be used to cause people to
believe lies they told).
103. See James M. Henslin, Craps and Magic, 73 AM. J. Soc. 316, 319 (1967).
104. Langer, supra note 24, at 231.
105. See id. at 238.
106. See id
107. Id. at 231; see also ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL 193 (1967) (listing a streak
of "ill luck" as a common reason for dismissal of experienced casino dealers).
108. See Langer, supra note 24, at 236-37.
109. See id; see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical
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groups were offered money for their tickets. Since the tickets each represented the
same random chance at winning a prize, one would expect the two groups to sell their
tickets for more or less the same price. Instead, the choice group demanded four times
as much money for their tickets as did the assigned group.°10 There was no ambiguity
about the nature of the game; this was a random lottery. Nevertheless, the mere fact of
selection influenced the choice group to believe that they could affect their chance of
winning and that their tickets were therefore worth more."'
Our tendency to believe we can impact even purely random events can make us
overly optimistic about our ability to plan for the future. We are likely to believe our
choices affect the future far more than they actually do, lending us a false sense of
assurance that our desired outcome will in fact occur.
2. Cognitive Dissonance
We have an unfortunate tendency to cling to ideas. especially once we have invested
in them or acted on them.1 2 When we encounter a cognition that conflicts with an idea
or emotion we already hold, we experience dissonance, or psychological discomfort." 
3
We can alleviate this discomfort by rejecting the new stimulus, discarding our
previously held conflicting cognition, or resolving the two so that they no longer
contradict one another."14
Cognitive dissonance can cause us to discount new information that conflicts with
our preexisting conceptual map. Rather than endure psychological discomfort, we may
choose to disbelieve information that conflicts with cherished beliefs. Alternatively,
even if we believe the new information, we may go to great lengths to avoid the
implication that our preexisting conceptions have been demonstrated to be false.
One study that demonstrated this aspect of cognitive dissonance began with a group
of teenagers attending a church retreat. 1 5 The teenagers were divided into two groups
based on whether they believed that Jesus was the son of God. Both groups were
administered a questionnaire to measure the intensity of their religious belief. The
subjects all then read a fictitious newspaper article purporting to reveal that
Christianity was a hoax. While most of the teenagers disbelieved the article, about one-
third thought it was true. The subjects then filled out a second questionnaire to again
measure the intensity of their religious belief."6
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEo. L.J. 1, 97 (2004).
110. See Langer, supra note 24, at 237.
111. See id. at 237-38; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 109, at 97 ("[S]ubjects were
apparently under the illusion that by choosing their tickets they had increased their chances of
winning the first lottery.").
112. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587, 1593-1602 (2006).
113. See id. at 1601; Matthew D. Lieberman, Kevin N. Ochsner, Daniel T. Gilbert & Daniel
L. Schacter, Do Amnesiacs Exhibit Cognitive Dissonance Reduction? The Role of Explicit
Memory and Attention in Attitude Change, 12 PSYCHOL. SC. 135, 135 (2001).
114. See Burke, supra note 112, at 1594-98 (discussing confirmation bias and selective
information processing).
115. See Batson, Psychology of Religion, supra note 26, at 416; Batson, Rational
Processing, supra note 26, at 179.
116. See Batson, Psychology of Religion, supra note 26, at 416.
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Among those teenagers who believed Jesus was the son of God and who also
believed the article told the truth, the intensity of religious belief actually increased. No
other subgroup demonstrated an increase in religious fervor after reading the fake
newspaper article." 
7
Logic would seem to dictate that if the newspaper article were true, as this subgroup
believed, that religious fervor would decrease. Who, after all, would cling to a belief
credibly revealed to be a hoax? Yet the true believers had precisely the opposite
reaction. Their faith was strengthened, not weakened, by the fake article's revelations.
This reaction seems irrational, but becomes explicable through the dynamic of
cognitive dissonance. The information in the article questioned a core belief, creating
substantial emotional unease. 18
One strategy to cope with this discomfort would have been to attack the validity of
the source, disbelieving the article. Two-thirds of the teenagers who believed Jesus was
the son of God appear to have adopted this tactic."19 An alternative approach is to
rationalize around the new information to find an explanation that reconciles the new
information with preexisting beliefs, or at a minimum allows the two to coexist. For
example, these subjects might have thought to themselves that even if Christianity
began as a hoax, it had evolved over the centuries to discover universal and divine
truths that superseded any questionable origins. This sort of rationalization would
permit the teenagers to maintain their original beliefs in the face of what they believed
to be strong conflicting evidence.1
20
Cognitive dissonance may prevent decision makers from absorbing and granting
appropriate weight to evidence that contradicts favored beliefs and opinions. Contrary
evidence provides a necessary check against excessive enthusiasm for a view, helping
to remind actors that their initial opinion may well be mistaken. By obscuring
conflicting evidence and permitting evaluators to focus only on evidence that confirms
their predilections, cognitive dissonance may excessively enhance optimism in the face
of uncertainty.
C. Group Decision Issues
Groups are often credited with improving the quality of decisions.' 2 ' More
participants bring a wider range of perspectives and a richer diversity of ideas, as well
117. See id.
118. See id. ("Consistent with Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance (but not
with logic), those believers who indicated they accepted the article as true actually expressed
more intense religious belief on a subsequent questionnaire.").
119. See Batson, Rational Processing, supra note 26, at 182.
120. Id. at 182-83. Again, the point here is not that such reasoning is rational, only that
cognitive dissonance may contrive to render it persuasive.
121. See Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 12 ("[Njumerous studies have found that group
decisions are not only superior to those of the average member, but also to those made by the
very best individual decisionmakers within the group."); Sunstein, supra note 44, at 73
("[M]any recent observers have embraced the traditional American aspiration to 'deliberative
democracy,' an ideal that is designed to combine popular responsiveness with a high degree of
reflection and exchange among people with competing views.").
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as a broader knowledge base. 122 Groups seem particularly sagacious when organized
into markets. 23 Markets have been established or proposed to predict things as varied
as the Academy Awards, presidential elections, and terrorist attacks. 24 Nevertheless,
groups are also prone to certain systematic weaknesses. Two of these weaknesses are
relevant to confident uncertainty: groupthink and social cascades. In essence,
groupthink is the tendency of certain groups to succumb to excessive consensus.
25
Social cascades present the illusion of efficient market decisions under conditions that
represent very little actual data.
126
1. Groupthink
Decision-making bodies generally require a certain degree of group cohesion to
function properly. Without some cohesion, some loyalty to one another or to a purpose
larger than individual self-interest, groups' efforts may dissolve in fractious infighting.
Too much cohesion, however, can be as problematic as having too little, because
excessive cohesion can produce groupthink.
Groupthink consists of at least seven group characteristics that together can cause
serious group decision-making flaws. 127 Cohesive groups generally consider only a
limited range of options, seldom consider the goals to be met by the decision, and
rarely delve beyond the obvious disadvantages of the choice initially favored by the
majority of the group. They tend to avoid seriously considering options initially
opposed by the majority. Cohesive groups often forgo the opportunity to consult with
experts from outside the group who might provide data or opinions that undermine the
favored option. Even when confronted with contrary data, cohesive groups tend to
ignore information that argues against the favored policy, and to highlight information
122. See Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 19 ("Multiple sources of information may make it less
costly to gather information .... ).
123. See JOYCE BERG, ROBERT FORSYTHE, FORREST NELSON & THOMAS RErrz, RESULTS FROM
A DOZEN YEARS OF ELECTION FuTuREs MARKET RESEARCH 4-5 (2000),
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/BFNR_2000.pdf (reporting that the Iowa decision market
outperformed political polls in predicting results nine times out of fifteen).
124. See Daniel Goldin, And the 3-to-I Winner Is.. ., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at ElO
(noting that the prediction market Hollywood Stock Exchange correctly forecast Academy
Award winners in 2005); Guy Gugliotta, In California Race, an Online Invitation to Profit,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2003, at A06 (describing an abandoned Defense Department proposal to
set up a decision market to predict terrorist attacks, modeled on the Iowa Electronic Markets that
predict political election results); Steve Lohr, Betting to Improve the Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2008, at H I (describing prediction markets used to estimate demand for products and movie box
office returns).
125. See Gia B. Lee, The President's Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 197, 235 (2008)
("Groupthink delineates a set of conditions and processes that leads groups toward an 'extreme
consensus-seeking' tendency and thereby interferes with critical thinking."); Marlene E. Turner
& Anthony R. Pratkanis, Twenty-Five Years ofGroupthink Theory andResearch: Lessons from
the Evaluation of a Theory, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 106
(1998).
126. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1233, 1240 (2003); Sunstein, supra note 44, at 84 (describing social cascades).
127. JANIS, supra note 25, at 9-10.
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that supports that policy. Finally, cohesive groups neglect to form contingency plans to
deal with foreseeable obstacles to success. 1
28
Cohesion is often considered a desirable group characteristic.' 29 Groups that lack
cohesion may expend too much energy mediating conflicts to achieve their goals. They
may enjoy little trust, experience difficulties communicating, and suffer through
unproductive debates.' 30 Cohesiveness can lead to the development of positive social
norms that enhance a group's ability to function efficiently.'
31
While some cohesion is useful, excessive cohesion, combined with a lack of
cognitive conflict, can produce poor decision making. 32 Groups need intellectual
diversity to function best. They require contrasting ideas to spark a debate that leaves
them open to possibilities other than the one first considered or advanced by their
leader. Without some conflict, groups risk becoming self-reinforcing-with members
reassuring the others that their ideas are absolutely correct. Once this dynamic
manifests, groups experience difficulty absorbing new evidence that conflicts with their
existing powerful consensus. They have trouble conceiving that anyone would feel
differently or that the group's fundamental assumptions could be misguided.
The most famous experiment demonstrating the power of social conformity was
conducted by Solomon Asch. '33 Asch presented subjects with three lines and asked
them which best matched a line on a white card. 134 The task was not difficult; ninety-
nine percent of the subjects answered the question correctly in the absence of
experimental manipulations.135 Asch also asked the same question of solitary subjects
in a group of experimental confederates.' 36 Asch's grouped subjects were asked the
question first, and each chose the same, incorrect, answer. 137 Faced with a strong social
consensus that contradicted their private opinions, over seventy percent of the subjects
went along with the group at least once.' 
38
128. Id. at 10.
129. See Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 32; Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 799 (2001).
130. See Langevoort, supra note 129, at 800.
131. Cf id.
132. See Forbes & Milliken, supra note 25, at 496-97.
133. SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450-59 (1952) [hereinafter ASCH, Social
Psychology]; see also Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT
THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1995); Solomon E. Asch, Studies ofIndependence
and Conformity, 70 PSYCH. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1 (1956).
134. ASCH, Social Psychology, supra note 133, at 450-59; Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of
Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 983, 1019-21
(2005); Sunstein, supra note 44, at 79.
135. See AsCH, Social Psychology, supra note 133, at450-59; see also Kim, supra note 134,
at 1019-21; Sunstein, supra note 44, at 79.
136. See David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1781, 1797 (2007) (describing
Asch's experiments).
137. See ASCH, Social Psychology, supra note 133, at 452-54; Edward L. Glaeser,
Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 137 (2006) (describing Asch's
experiments).
138. ASCH, Social Psychology, supra note 133, at 457; see also Kim, supra note 134, at
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Groupthink, in some ways, is the social analogue of cognitive dissonance. Overly
cohesive groups demonstrate some of the same behaviors produced by cognitive
dissonance, such as giving short shrift to alternative options, overlooking contrary
information, and highlighting information that supports the initial theory. 39 As
cognitive dissonance does for individuals, groupthink may lead groups to become
overly optimistic about their ability to manage uncertainty. 14 Groups that fail to pay
sufficient attention to conflicting evidence due to groupthink may come to believe too
strongly in their initial projections, producing excessive confidence.
2. Social Cascades
Social cascades can arise when individuals or groups make a decision sequentially,
knowing about the decisions that others have made before them. At some point in the
chain, decision makers may begin to ignore their private information in favor of the
crowd's views. 141 This response may be a rational calculation that the crowd has more
information than any single individual; 42 alternatively, it may represent an attempt to
preserve reputation, at the expense of making an incorrect decision.
143
The behavior of individuals involved in social cascades may be rational.
Particularly when the actor has little other information-following the lead of the
crowd, even a crowd of strangers, may represent the best strategy. If each person in the
group makes an independent decision, based on his or her own information ignoring
those who preceded him or her, then the crowd's decision should contain a great deal
of information-the aggregation of each individual's private knowledge. Social
cascades occur, however, when most people adopt the "follow-the-crowd" strategy
rather than making an independent decision. 144 When most individuals ignore their own
information in favor of following the majority, the group's decision contains only the
information of the first few decision makers. If these pioneers happen all to make the
same, wrong selection, the bulk of the group may fall in line even if the decision
contradicts their own private information. 1
45
A famous classroom experiment designed by economists Lisa Anderson and Charles
Holt should serve to illustrate the principle. 146 Anderson and Holt placed three balls in
each of two urns, A and B. In urn A, they placed two light balls and one dark ball; in
urn B they placed two dark balls and one light ball. 147 They then flipped a coin to
determine which urn would be chosen, and then poured the balls of the chosen urn into
a third urn or cup. 48 Students were then invited up in random order to draw a ball from
1019-21; Sunstein, supra note 44, at 79.
139. See supra Part II.B.5.
140. See id.
141. See supra note 44.
142. See Banerjee, supra note 44, at 798; Bikhchandani, supra note 44, at 154.
143. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 78.
144. See Bikhchandani, supra note 44, at 154.
145. See id. at 154-55.
146. Anderson & Holt, Classroom Games, supra note 44, at 189 (describing game);
Anderson & Holt, Information Cascades, supra note 44, at 847 (describing experimental
results).
147. Anderson & Holt, Information Cascades, supra note 44, at 849.
148. Anderson & Holt, Classroom Games, supra note 44, at 189.
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the cup, replace it, and then guess which urn had been chosen. 149 The student's
decision was publicized to the rest of the class, but the signal (the color of the ball
drawn) remained private.' 50
A student who draws a light ball from the cup should guess urn A, since the
probability is two to one that urn A was chosen.' 5 1 Conversely, a student who draws a
dark ball from the cup should guess urn B since the same odds favor that urn B was
chosen. In both cases, the student should be correct two-thirds of the time.' 5 2 So far,
the game appears quite straightforward.
The game becomes more interesting, however, once more students begin to play.
Suppose that urn A is selected in the coin toss. If the first student draws a light ball and
guesses urn A, and the second student also draws a light ball, the second student should
also guess urn A since the publicly available information (that the previous student had
drawn a light ball) matches the student's private information (that this student also
drew a light ball). But what if both the first and second students draw dark balls? Both
should select urn B: the first student because a dark ball has a two-to-one chance of
coming from urn B, and the second student both for that reason and because the first
student's choice of urn B indicates that he also drew a dark ball. Even if the third
student then draws a light ball, she should choose urn B. Although her private
information (the light ball) indicates that urn A was more likely the winner of the coin
toss, the two previous students' selections suggest that they both drew dark balls. Since
dark balls were drawn twice, and a light ball only once, the third student should guess
urn B.'
53
This is how cascades begin. From this point on, no matter what color ball each
student draws, he or she should guess urn B. The publicly available information (that
every student before has chosen urn B and therefore presumably drawn a dark ball)
overwhelms the privately available information (that this particular student may have
drawn a light ball). Anderson and Holt observed in their experiment that cascades
began in seventy-five percent of the games in which they were possible, that is, when
the first two students both drew the same color balls.'
54
Results produced by a social cascade often acquire the credibility of the market. In a
cascade, multiple, apparently independent, and often sophisticated players reach the
same conclusion. When the decision makers have strong economic motivations to
reach the correct result, observers may describe the outcome as the market's verdict, as
though the result were in fact the product of multiple independent decisions made on
the basis of separate information. At this point, anyone wanting to dispute the result's
wisdom must overcome the powerful argument that the market has determined the
efficient outcome.'
55
149. Anderson & Holt, Information Cascades, supra note 44, at 849.
150. Id.
151. Since urn A has two light balls and urn B only one, the odds are two to one that any
light ball chosen came from urn A.
152. Anderson & Holt, Information Cascades, supra note 44, at 849.
153. See id. at 849-50.
154. See id. at 851-52.
155. See Dorff, supra note 8, at 2051 ("Once a cascade of either type has taken hold, the
resulting decision takes on the legitimacy of the market.").
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Cascades can interfere greatly with our efforts to reach valid inductive conclusions.
They create an appearance of data where none exists-generating an illusion that many
people have independently reached the same conclusion based on private information
when in reality most have just mimicked those who decided before them. In addition,
reputation-based cascades interfere with our analysis of whatever information we do
have, skewing us toward decisions for reasons other than inductive logic. Cascades
can, therefore, inspire undue confidence in decision makers. Cascades can cause
participants to believe they are following the decision of a well-informed and carefully
calibrated marketplace when the outcome is actually based on very little data.'
56
D. Conclusion
Although wealthy, sophisticated market participants are generally considered highly
rational,157 a number of well-documented psychological phenomena combine to induce
undue optimism even in these elite actors. The illusion of validity disguises largely
irrelevant data as highly probative data. 158 The representativeness heuristic confuses
events' similarity with causality.159 The illusion of control hints that random events are
subject to conscious manipulation.160 Cognitive dissonance overlooks information that
contradicts preexisting beliefs. 16' Groupthink fulfills a similar function for decisions
made joitly. 62 Finally, social cascades mask reliance on prior public decisions as a
well-functioning market. 163 Together, these heuristics and biases encourage excessive
optimism even in those we most expect to resemble the rational calculating machines
envisioned by economics.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Beethoven.com L.L.C. v. Librarian of Cong., 394 F.3d 939, 947 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (arguing that the contract was particularly reliable because it involved sophisticated
market participants with substantial resources); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173,
191 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing how institutional investors should be the lead plaintiff in
securities class actions because they have a large financial stake in the transaction and have the
incentive and the sophistication to monitor the litigation); In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA
Litig., 326 F.3d 201, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2003) (observing the fact that settlement reached by
sophisticated parties with conflicting interests argues in favor of its fairness).
158. See Prentice, supra note 45, at 1462 n.307 ("[P]eople will be confident in the prediction
that a person is a librarian when a description of that person matches a stereotype of a librarian,
even if the information contained in the description is scanty, unreliable, or outdated."); Ripken,
supra note 45, at 960 (illusion of validity causes people making judgments under uncertainty to
experience excessive confidence in fallible choices); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 9
(describing the illusion of validity); Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology ofPrediction, supra note
37, at 249 (describing the illusion of validity).
159. See Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability, supra note 22, at 33; Tversky &
Kahneman, Representativeness, supra note 38, at 84-85.
160. Henslin, supra note 103, at 316; Langer, supra note 24, at 231.
161. See Batson, Psychology of Religion, supra note 26, at 416; Burke, supra note 112, at
1593-1602; Lieberman, supra note 113, at 135.
162. See JANiS, supra note 25, at 9-10; Forbes & Milliken, supra note 25, at 496-97; Lee,
supra note 125, at 235; Turner & Pratkanis, supra note 125, at 106.
163. See O'Connor, supra note 126, at 1240; Sunstein, supra note 44, at 84.
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In the next section, I will apply the explanatory power of confident uncertainty to
the hiring of corporate CEOs. I will argue that confident uncertainty provides a
powerfully descriptive account of excessive compensation in the corporate executive
labor market.
II. PUBLIC COMPANY CEOs
A. Background
CEOs of publicly held corporations exercise substantial authority over enormous
wealth. 16 4 The CEOs of the Fortune 500 companies alone presided over $9.1 trillion in
revenues and $610 billion in profits in 2005165 Although the corporation's broad
strategy decisions must be approved by the board of directors, they are generally
initiated by the CEO. For day-to-day operations, the CEO has essentially unchecked
authority. As a result, although the CEO rarely owns a meaningful percentage of the
company's equity, the chief executive does exercise appreciable control.
A public corporation's board of directors hires the company's CEO. The largest
group represented on the boards of large, public corporations is current or former
CEOs of other large, public corporations. 166 Boards overwhelmingly consist of white,
middle-aged men from privileged backgrounds. 167 Other groups commonly represented
on boards include "inside directors," such as officers of the corporation,' 68 friends of
the CEO, 169 and "celebrity" directors-prominent academics and retired politicians.1
70
Public institutional shareholders are rarely represented despite often owning a
considerable stake in the corporation. 171 Directors are formally elected by the
164. In references to the CEO in this article, I intend to include the chair of the board of
directors when, as is increasingly the case, those two positions are held by different individuals.
165. See Ellen McGirt, The Fortune 500: A Banner Year, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 4,2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/3 I/news/companies/intro_f500_fortune/index.htm.
166. CEOs of other companies constitute some sixty-three percent of outside directors.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 875; see also ROBERT A. G. MONKS, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 187 (2d ed. 2001) (finding that eighty-six percent of billion-dollar company
boards include at least one CEO or chief operating officer of another company); Bogus, supra
note 7, at 36 (noting cases of CEOs sitting on each other's compensation committees); Dorff,
supra note 7, at 845 ("Because CEOs want their own companies' boards to remain passive, they
have little incentive to oppose management's desires when they sit on boards of other
corporations.").
167. See KORN/FERRY INT'L, 30TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 10 (2003) (finding
that, in 2002, eighty-three percent of boards included a CEO or chief operating officer of
another company, while only forty-four percent included even one African-American board
member and only seventeen percent included at least one Latino board member).
168. Dorff, supra note 7, at 845.
169. Id., at 846; Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L.
REv. 75, 109 (1993); Yablon, supra note 8, at 1881.
170. Dorff, supra note 7, at 847.
171. Id. at 946-47; see also Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811, 823-24 (1992) (noting that institutional
shareholders face many obstacles to nominating their own directors, including a risk of liability
for insider trading or short-swing profits).
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corporation's shareholders, but the shareholders have little real say over the board's
composition. Outside of the hostile-takeover context, directors generally run
unopposed, making the board an effectively self-perpetuating body.
The largest companies reward their stewards with considerable compensation. Total
pay for Fortune 500 corporations' CEOs typically reaches seven figures, and some
CEOs have easily breached the eight figure mark. 172 For many corporations, the
amount paid to the CEO now accounts for a noticeable percentage of the company's
profits. 1
73
CEO pay has certainly attracted its critics, who largely argue that CEOs' enormous
pay packages are the result of agency costs stemming from the separation of ownership
and control. 74 That is, shareholders own the corporation's equity, but the real power
lies in the hands of the board and the CEO. 17 5 As a result, managers may exercise
considerable power over the board of directors and may use this power to extract
excessive compensation.
1 76
Defenders counter that the talent required to run a major corporation is expensive
because it is both scarce and valuable. For example, one recent study calculated that
the difference in talent between the number one CEO and the 250th CEO translates to a
market cap differential of only .016%.177 Nevertheless, the authors argued, because
market capitalizations of Fortune 500 corporations are so large, even such incredibly
small talent distinctions are worth paying enormous sums to obtain.1
78
Still, these efficiency-rooted stories have difficulty explaining the rapid changes in
both absolute and relative CEO compensation or many of the more troubling structural
aspects of the typical CEO pay package and their disconnect from the CEO's
individual attainments. 79 1 cannot hope to do justice to the efficiency debate in this
short space, nor do I believe that the debate has reached (or will reach) a conclusive
172. See Joann S. Lublin, Persistent Pay Gains: A Survey Overview, WALL ST. J., Apr, 14,
2008, at RI (explaining that the median direct compensation for CEOs of top 200 U.S.
corporations was $8.85 million in 2007, but Merrill Lynch's John Thain ($78.5 million),
Goldman Sachs' Lloyd Blankfein ($68.5 million), Occidental Petroleum's Ray Irani ($61
million), American Express's Kenneth Chenault ($46.2 million), and Lehman Brothers' Richard
Fuld Jr. ($40 million) are among those CEOs earning much more).
173. See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL'Y 283, 284 (2005) ("The aggregate compensation paid by public firms to their
top-five executives was 9.8 per cent of the aggregate earnings of these firms during 2001-3, up
from 5 per cent during 1993-5."); Kathy M. Kristof, California Executive Pay Report: Out of
Balance?, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at C I (reporting that CEO pay accounted for an average
of two percent of profits for top 100 California corporations).
174. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7.
175. The classic text first making this argument was, of course, ADOLPH A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY (Bearle & Means ed.,
Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
176. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 61-79.
177. See Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? Q. J.
ECON., Feb. 2008, at 49, 50.
178. Id.
179. See Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 173, at 284 (documenting growth in executive
pay and arguing that it cannot be explained by changes in firm size, performance, or industry
mix).
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judgment. Fundamentally, the CEO functions as the leader of a vast team, and the
CEO's success or failure rests to a great degree on the achievements of everyone else
in the company. The company's success also depends on circumstances beyond any
individual's control, such as general economic conditions, the development of new
technologies, the market prices of commodities, interest rates, and a host of other
factors too numerous to list.'80 The CEO's part in determining a company's fate is,
therefore, necessarily amorphous. Without a clear demarcation of a CEO's individual
contribution, we cannot discover with any certainty whether compensation is
overblown.
Congress and the Obama administration, however, have clearly aligned themselves
with the view that executive compensation is excessive and poorly structured. ' 81 To
evaluate their solutions, I will assume throughout the Article that their position is
correct (as I in fact believe it to be). Readers who do not share this belief may argue
that what follows is irrelevant-an explanation of a nonexistent problem. Still, to the
extent their views of executive compensation are rooted in an implicit faith in
employment markets, they will, I hope, find that faith severely challenged by the next
section.
180. Bebchuk and Fried argue:
Without significant adjustments, however, changes in share price are not a good
indicator of a manager's own performance. A company's stock price can increase
for reasons that have nothing to do with its managers' own efforts and decision
making. Falling interest rates, for example, can cause stock prices to increase
considerably without managers lifting a finger. Indeed, one study of U.S. stock
prices over a recent ten-year period reported that only 30 percent of share price
movement reflects corporate performance; the remaining 70 percent is driven by
general market conditions. If performance is measured by changes in share price,
managers who perform poorly relative to their peers might still be rewarded when
the market or sector rises as a whole.
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 139.
181. A Department of Treasury press release states: "[Tlhe compensation committees of all
companies receiving government assistance must provide an explanation of how their senior
executive compensation arrangements do not encourage excessive and unnecessary risk-taking."
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2. The Obama Plan also states: "Over the
last decade there has been an emerging consensus that top executives should receive
compensation that encourages more of a long-term perspective on creating economic value for
their shareholders and the economy at large." Id. Moreover, the Obama Plan calls for a
conference on executive pay reform at financial institutions. Id. Similarly, the Dodd provisions
require Troubled Asset Relief Program recipients to exclude "incentives for senior executive
officers... to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of such recipient...
." American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § I lI(b)(3)(A), 123
Stat. 115, 517 (2009). Both plans provide for strict new limits on compensation, the Obama
Plan on salaries and the Dodd provisions on bonuses, reflecting a belief that market restraints
are inadequate. See id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2.
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B. Behavioral Economic Analysis
1. The Uncertainty of Future Performance
Economists Gabaix and Landier have argued that public company CEOs are very
similar in ability, with the difference between the best and the 250th accounting for
only a .016% difference in their corporations' market capitalizations. 82 Presumably,
the top candidates for any particular CEO position are even closer in ability. There is
reason to doubt that boards are capable of accurately assessing such tiny talent
gradations. Moreover, with closely comparable talents, luck may play a larger role than
any small difference in ability to determine a candidate's future success.
We should also be concerned that boards may be vastly overpaying for the talent
they secure. CEO compensation has increased exponentially over the past several
decades, far outpacing inflation or the increases in the salaries paid to lower level
workers. In the early 1980s, public company CEOs earned an average of forty-two
times what factory workers earned, now they earn some four hundred times as much as
factory workers do.183 Perhaps even more troublingly, public companies increasingly
pay their CEOs in ways that reward them regardless of the CEOs' performance.' 84
Traditional stock options, for example, often become more valuable for reasons
completely apart from the company's performance. In 2005, when oil prices climbed
dramatically, oil company stock prices rose commensurately. As a result, Ray Irani, the
chief executive of Occidental Petroleum, received nearly sixty-three million dollars in
compensation that year, the vast majority of which came from stock options.1 85 John
Drosdick, Sunoco's chief executive, received almost twenty-three million dollars, again
mostly in options. 186 Yet, neither company's chief executive caused the spike in oil
prices that created their new wealth. Their stories are far from unique. 187 Option
holders often greatly benefit from general increases in the stock market due to an
expanding economy or lower interest rates, which are factors having nothing to do with
individual performance.' 
88
Uncertainty suffuses the hiring and compensation processes, and there seems little
cause to suppose that directors are immune from the heuristics and biases that handicap
182. See Gabaix & Landier, supra note 177, at 50.
183. Dorff, supra note 7, at 823.
184. See BEBCHuK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 87-185.
185. See J. Alex Tarquinio, Pay for Oil Chiefs SpikedLike Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,2006,
at B10.
186. Id.; BW Executive Compensation, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Apr. 4, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_l4/b3927433_mz080.htm.
187. Warren Buffet famously complained about the divergence between individual
performance and the rewards granted by options given to lower-level managers in his 1985
Letter to Shareholders. Letter from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc., to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., (Mar. 4 1986),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/l985.html.
188. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 139 (citing one study showing that seventy




the rest of us when coping with the unknown. 8 9 In choosing a new CEO, the board is
likely to rely on invalid data, mistake similarity for probability, and take erroneous
credit for causing random events.' 90 Cognitive dissonance and groupthink may magnify
all these effects by protecting poor conclusions from having to confront contrary
data. 191
2. The Illusion of Validity
The information available to a board when hiring a CEO includes an applicant's
educational background, career path, track record, and the intangible sense of the
person that comes from an interview. This data is undoubtedly useful in separating out
reasonable office seekers from those whose ambitions are unrealistic. An aspirant with
only three years of business experience is unlikely to serve ably as the chief executive
of a multibillion dollar company. But when the board is choosing among the final
contenders, all of whom have broadly similar backgrounds, 92 the directors are likely to
greatly overestimate the degree to which this information is capable of predicting
future success.' 93 The facts they have available contain much more noise than they will
typically realize.194
Neither the candidates' rdsumds nor their interviews possess the predictive power
that most people would credit to them.195 The information in a rdsum-particularly in
the rdsum6 of someone sufficiently accomplished to be seriously considered as the
CEO of a major company-will be broadly consistent, portraying impressive position
after impressive position and success after success. This data is considerably dependent
but, due to the illusion of validity, will be perceived as though each accomplishment
represents separate proof of the applicant's abilities.
196
Attending a prestigious undergraduate institution facilitates securing a notable job
upon graduation. That job, in turn, together with the undergraduate experience, helps
one with gaining admission to a prestigious business school. The business school
degree gains one entry to another plum position, which leads to a series of others.
Although each job does provide independent information-the candidate performed
sufficiently well to continue advancing-much of the intelligence is highly dependent.
Early successes generate a virtuous circle that creates continuing opportunities. A
person's experience is likely to be perceived as though he or she had jumped from
189. See, e.g., CAss R. SuNsTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (2000) (documenting and
describing many such heuristics and biases).
190. See supra Part I.B.1-5 (describing the impact of uncertainty heuristics and biases on
the CEO selection and compensation process).
191. See supra Part II.B.6-7 (describing the impact of group decision-making phenomena on
the CEO selection and compensation process).
192. See KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 167, at 10 (reporting survey of directors that found
eighty-three percent of boards included a senior office of another corporation and that only
forty-four percent included even one African-American board member and only seventeen
percent included at least one Latino board member).
193. See supra note 45.
194. Id. (describing the illusion of validity).
195. See supra note 23.
196. See supra note 45.
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ground level to grasp each honor; but, in reality, a career path is more like climbing a
staircase; one can reach great heights by virtue of having already climbed some
distance before. The illusion of validity disguises stair climbers as high jumpers.
Job interviews similarly convey a mistaken impression of validity.197 We tend to
store great trust in interviews because we feel we can get a highly accurate sense of a
person through a short period of face-to-face conversation. One survey of 852
organizations found that ninety-nine percent of them relied on interviews as part of the
hiring process. 198 Even a short conversation, on the order of twenty to thirty minutes,
can imbue sufficient confidence to make a decision about a position that may be held
for decades. Candidates with highly impressive paper credentials may nevertheless fail
to secure a position because of how they fare during the screening interview.
99
Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed conducted a study that dramatized the impact
of personal interviews. 20 Subjects were asked to choose courses for their
undergraduate major in psychology. The subjects were divided into two groups. The
members of the first group each interviewed an older student and asked which courses
that student had preferred and why. The members of the second group received data
reflecting the mean course evaluation of many students (ranging from twenty-six to
142) on a five-point scale. The interview impacted subjects' choices much more
powerfully than the course evaluations even though the evaluations reflected the input
of many more students.
201
But, our reliance on interviews appears misguided, a result of the illusion of
validity.20 2 Candidates impress in interviews because they project the image of the
good employee-persuading the interviewer that their traits match those of the
theorized ideal candidate. When we pause to analyze the interview as a data-collection
method aimed at producing an inductive judgment, however, we quickly realize its
many flaws. The interview consists of a short conversation in which the candidate
responds to questions designed to ferret out his or her chances of establishing a
successful career. The questions may focus on personal background, interest in the
position, hypothetical problems that might arise in the job, or tests of relevant
substantive knowledge. Indirectly, the interviewer may learn about the subject's
personability, sense of humor, and ability to engage in light conversation.
Compare this short performance with the record demonstrated by the candidate's
r~sumd or by the candidate's letters of recommendation from former positions. These
sources represent information collected over a substantial period of time, often by
numerous different evaluators, in a variety of situations-many of which are likely
comparable to those the candidate is likely to face in the actualjob. Which test is likely
to be a better predictor of the candidate's ability to perform tasks over time? The
candidate's skill as demonstrated over twenty minutes to a single questioner (or even a
small group), or the candidate's ability to impress numerous supervisors across a
diverse range of related tasks? Not surprisingly, according to most studies the
197. See supra note 23.
198. Ulrich & Trumbo, supra note 23, at 100-16.
199. Id.(describing results of survey).
200. See Nisbett et al., supra note 90, at 113-15.
201. Id.
202. See supra note 23.
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interview turns out to be an indifferent predictor of future performance despite its near-
universal use.
20 3
Board members have little choice but to rely on candidates' past experiences and
interpersonal skills in estimating their future success. But they should use these tools
advisedly, with a strong sense of their limits. They should-but I suspect do
not-always bear in mind that the evaluative methods at their disposal are crude
predictors and are incapable of accurately making fine distinctions. Placing too much
faith in past successes and flawed tools such as personal interviews may create
unwarranted confidence in the ultimate selection.
3. The Representativeness Heuristic
What is the probability that two events are causally linked? How do we know
whether to attribute a positive outcome to a particular actor? Suppose Dilma Garcia
served as CEO of Public Company, Inc. for a three-year period during which the
company saw unprecedented profit growth. Should Public Company's success be
attributed to its leader, Garcia?
To understand whether Garcia should be credited with Public Company's success, it
would help to know the likelihood that the company would have grown dramatically
even without Garcia's involvement. That is, what was the growth rate of companies
similar to Garcia's during Garcia's tenure at the company? If Public Company is an oil
producer and Garcia took office in 2005, we might be a bit skeptical about the link
between Garcia's talents and the company's rise. During 2007, oil prices nearly
doubled, creating enormous profits for all major oil producing corporations.2°4 Public
Company might have profited just as richly under any competent executive's
leadership during such prosperous times, so the company's success by itself tells us
less about Garcia's skills than we might think.
Studies demonstrate, however, that we tend to attribute causation based more on
what our preconceptions lead us to believe we will observe than on the actual data.205
We jump to the conclusion that the actor, not the situation, is responsible.2 6 We tend
to cling to whatever specific information we have, even if it is not very probative, at the
expense of less salient base-rate information. 20 7 We make worse decisions when we
have worthless case-based evidence than when we have no case-based evidence.
20 8
The upper echelons of the corporate world are remarkably homogeneous. Board
members and senior executives in Fortune 500 companies are overwhelmingly white
and male.2°9 Since the board members almost by definition have attained remarkable
203. There have been a number of major review studies that have reached this conclusion.
See supra note 23.
204. See Jad Mouawad, Exxon Profit Hits Record on Surge in Oil, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Feb.
2, 2008 at 11.
205. See Dennis L. Jennings, Teresa M. Amabile & Lee Ross, Informal Covariation
Assessment: Data-Based Versus Theory-Based Judgments, in JuDGMENTUNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 19, at 211, 215-16.
206. Ross & Anderson, supra note 21, at 135 (describing the fundamental attribution error).
207. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 4-5.
208. Id. at 5.
209. See KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 167, at 10 (finding that in 2002, only forty-four
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levels of success, it is natural-and an application of the representativeness heuristic-
for them to seek out candidates who are similar to themselves. This tendency may help
explain the stubborn persistence of the "glass ceiling," with troublingly few minorities
or women among the ranks of Fortune 500 CEOs.
210
Irrelevant information may actually prove quite damaging. As with the study asking
subjects to estimate the probability that a personality profile was of an engineer or a
lawyer, knowing a little bit of useless information about someone can cause boards to
ignore more telling -but less salient-basal data.211 The syllogism-I succeeded, so
people like me are more likely to achieve-is highly seductive, though false, and likely
to excessively inflate confidence in hiring decisions.
4. Illusion of Control
A corporation's success depends on a raft of factors such as corporate strategy,
input markets, product markets, customer demand, interest rates, employee talent and
loyalty, and general economic conditions. Some of these factors are predominantly the
product of talent; others are largely the product of luck. For example, the CEO's ability
to inspire loyalty and hard work among the employees can mostly be attributed to the
CEO's innate skill with people. But the broad economic conditions the company faces
are almost entirely outside the company's control.
In judging the CEO's performance, the board of directors may succumb to the
illusion of control.212 That is, the directors may consider the company's results as due
primarily to the CEO's actions. They are correspondingly likely to discount the role of
chance in producing outcomes. 213 The illusion of control may, therefore, induce the
board to evaluate CEO candidates by crediting the candidates entirely for their
employer's past successes (and faulting them for their employer's failures).
Consequently, the board is likely to experience excessive optimism about their
candidates' talents and about the ability of any CEO to control the corporation's fate.
The illusion of control thus contributes to boards' disproportionate optimism about
their ability to choose the best CEO and their corresponding tendency to pay exorbitant
sums for their first choice CEO candidate.
214
percent of public company boards included even one African American board member and only
seventeen percent included at least one Latino board member); Anya Sostek, Despite Advances,
the Number of Women on Corporate Boards Has Remained Relatively Stagnant, PWISBURGH
POST-GAzETrE, Aug. 25, 2006, at El (finding that women made up 14.7% of Fortune 500
company directors).
210. See generally Sostek, supra note 209.
211. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 4-5.
212. See GOFFMAN, supra note 107, at 193 (noting that dealers in Vegas who suffered bad-
luck streaks were often terminated for that reason); Henslin, supra note 103, at 319 (discussing a
study that shows that people throw fair dice harder when they want to roll a high number and
softer when they want a low number); Langer, supra note 24, at 231 (arguing people act as
though they can control random events when those events involve even a modicum of choice).
213. See supra note 101 (documenting the illusion of control).
214. See Barris, supra note 7, 60-61 (citing John A. Byrne, The Flap over Executive Pay,
Bus. WK., May 6, 1991, at 90,90) ("During the frenzied 1980s, CEO compensation jumped by
212% while earnings per share on the Standard and Poor's 500 Index grew by only 78%. In
contrast, factory workers' wages rose only 53%."); Bogus, supra note 7, at 10 (citing Byrne's




Cognitive dissonance makes the consideration of chance's role in executives'
achievements particularly unlikely. The board members are highly successful,
respected businesspeople. 215 Considering the role chance played in the candidate's
successes would require them to face the similar contribution luck made to their own
triumphs. Those directors who did raise this issue would risk facing censure from their
peers. If the cultural norm is to take credit for one's own successes, it will likely prove
difficult for any individual director to question the link between success and merit.
216
As a result, directors will prove overly optimistic about their CEO's native skill.
Cognitive dissonance may also help explain why public company boards approve
such lucrative compensation packages for their CEOs.217 The most prevalent full-time
occupation for public company directors is a high-level executive (generally CEO or
Chair of the Board) of another publicly traded company.2 18 CEOs no doubt believe that
they are worth their own high pay. Cognitive dissonance would then make it difficult
for them to consider the possibility that some other CEO is not. While they might feel
comfortable investigating whether some particular chief executive is worthy of the
post, the magnitude of compensation commanded by the position-that is, by a
competent CEO-may be more difficult to probe. Any serious questioning of the
notion that CEOs as a class deserve pay in the seven-figure range could call into
average workers has leaped from forty-two in the early 1980s to over 400 currently); Eisenberg,
Compensation, supra note 8, at 106-08 (finding that while U.S. CEOs earn 200 times what
factory workers earn, Japanese CEOs earn only about twenty to thirty times factory workers'
salaries); Eisenberg, Overview, supra note 8, at 301-02 ("[T]he evidence suggests that the total
compensation of American CEOs, including base salary, bonus, long-term compensation, and
benefits and perquisites, is approximately twice as high as that of CEOs of comparable
corporations in Japan, Germany, eight other west European countries, and Canada.");
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that from 1980-1995, average CEO pay increased
380% while average worker salaries rose only 60% and determining that U.S. CEOs appear to
be paid more than foreign CEOs, but executive pay is difficult to measure outside the U.S);
Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 202-03 (citing Tara Parker-Pope, So FarAway, WALL ST. J., Apr.
11, 1996, at R12) (noting that a 1996 study showed that U.S. CEOs earned an average of
$1,085,000 while average CEOs in Great Britain earned $551,600, in Germany $537,000, in
France $485,004, and in Italy $318,000 and CEO compensation rose 20.6% in 1993, 12.8% in
1994, and 10.4% in 1995); Perry & Zenner, supra, note 7, at 123-24 (finding that total CEO
compensation for all 1900 firms listed in the ExecuComp database more than doubled from
1992 to 1998, and CEOs from S&P 500 firms' compensation rose more than 250%); Yablon,
supra note 8, at 1871 (observing that in 1990, average U.S. CEOs earned $2.8 million per year
(120 times a manufacturing worker's salary) while their counterparts in Germany earned
$735,000 annually (twenty-one times a factory worker's compensation) and CEOs in Japan
earned only $310,000 (sixteen times a factory worker's salary)).
215. See KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 167, at 10 (finding that in 2002, eighty-three percent
of boards included a CEO or chief operating officer of another company, while only forty-four
percent included even one African American board member and only seventeen percent
included at least one Latino board member).
216. Boards subject to groupthink will find opposing this cultural norm particularly difficult.
See infra Part II.B.6.
217. See supra note 214.
218. See KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 167, at 10 (finding that in 2002, 83% of boards
included a CEO or COO of another company).
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219question their own entitlement to such sums, producing cognitive dissonance. One
way to avoid this dissonance is to dismiss any such information or argument.
6. Groupthink
Groupthink seems likely to develop on many public company boards.220 Both
friendship and prestige tend to promote group cohesiveness. 221 As Irving Janis,
groupthink's pioneer, wrote:
Concurrence-seeking tendencies probably are stronger when high cohesiveness is
based primarily on the rewards of being in a pleasant "clubby" atmosphere or of
gaining prestige from being a member of an elite group than when it is based
primarily on the opportunity to function competently on work tasks with effective
co-workers.
222
Directors are often selected on the basis of personal friendships and networking.223
Also, directorships of public corporations are highly prestigious, and that prestige
contributes to a sense of group competence that may inhibit directors' willingness to
consult outside opinions.
22 4
Janis also contended that a group's lack of diversity in training and background
contributes to groupthink.225 Public company boards overwhelmingly consist of white,
middle-aged men from privileged backgrounds who have spent their careers working
for large corporations.226 Although the board's homogeneity contributes to the board's
effectiveness by facilitating communication, lack of diversity also reduces dissent,
219. See generally FESTINGER, supra note 26 (describing cognitive dissonance); Batson,
Rational Processing, supra note 26, at 176.
220. See Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 32; Langevoort, supra note 129, at 810 (concluding
that boards naturally trend towards collegiality and hence groupthink); see also O'Connor,
supra note 126, at 1261-69 (arguing the Enron board suffered from groupthink).
221. JANIS, supra note 25, at 247.
222. Id.
223. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 31; see also Barry Baysinger & Robert E.
Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on
Corporate Strategy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 72, 72-73 (1990); Charles M. Elson, Executive
Compensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REv. 937, 975-76 (1993); O'Connor,
supra note 126, at 1249; cf Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 37-38 (endorsing boards generally
but with the caveat that a CEO's personal ties with board members may lead to an exploitative
relationship).
224. See JANIS, supra note 25, at 247; see also JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH M. MACIVER,
PAWNS OR POTENTATES?: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 64 (1989) (noting
that many directors feel their most critical role involves "the care and feeding of the chief
executive officer").
225. See JANIS, supra note 25, at 250.
226. See KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 167, at 10 (finding that in 2002, eighty-three percent
of boards included a CEO or chief operations officer of another company, while only forty-four
percent included even one African-American board member and only seventeen percent
included at least one Latino board member).
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contributing to groupthink.227 Not surprisingly, then, many scholars have argued that
corporate boards may be particularly susceptible to groupthink.228
Groupthink may account for boards' undue confidence in their ability to select the
best applicant for the CEO position. Organizations suffering from groupthink rarely
consider more than a few options when faced with a decision, generally fail to examine
the goals they seek to meet with the decision, and seldom consider disadvantages
beyond the obvious of the plan initially favored by the group.229 Corporate boards'
failure to recognize their own limitations may, therefore, result from a paucity of
considered options and a failure to examine possibilities closely and in relation to the
boards' goals. Even directors with ample experience may not pause to question
selection mechanisms they are accustomed to using.
Groupthink may also explain why CEOs are paid such exorbitant sums. Hard
questions about the proposed compensation package risk being perceived as criticisms
of the CEO. Groups subject to groupthink are unusually likely to follow their leader
because they perceive the leader as best embodying the group's values.230 Also, group
members tend to vote with their leader's views in order to reduce the stress generated
by some external threat or internal dilemma.2 3 1 Stress temporarily lowers self-esteem,
but joining the consensus created by a respected leader can reduce this stress and
restore self-confidence.232 Boards suffering from groupthink are far more likely to vote
with their leader, the CEO, and to perceive the CEO's views to be those of the board's
majority. 233 They are correspondingly unlikely to voice complaints or critiques of the
commonly used mechanisms.
This reluctance is especially likely since those critiques typically take the form of
concerns about potential CEO abuses, such as using the derivatives market to undo the
incentives created by options.234 Raising such concerns implies that this particular CEO
may act improperly, a view that will almost certainly prove unpopular and may subject
the speaker to sharp censure from his or her peers. Perhaps even worse, to the extent
enormous CEO pay has become commonplace and thereby taken on the credibility of
the market, critics of the status quo may risk being perceived as amateurish or naive. In
sum, groupthink may cause boards to experience undue optimism about the skills and
value of their CEO.
227. See JANiS, supra note 25, at 250; see also Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 32.
228. See Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 32; James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public
Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REv. 435, 462-66 (2004); Forbes &
Millken, supra note 25, at 496; O'Connor, supra note 126, at 1239.
229. JANIS, supra note 25, at 9-10.
230. See Fanto, supra note 228 at 463-64; see also John M. Levine, Lauren B. Resnick & E.
Tory Higgins, Social Foundations of Cognition, 44 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 585, 601 (1993)
(noting that groupthink is particularly present in cohesive groups with strong, directing leaders).
231. JANIS, supra note 25, at 255-56.
232. Id.
233. See id; Fanto, supra note 228 at 463-64; Levine, et al., supra note 230, at 601.
234. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 174-185 (arguing that firms have generally
taken few steps to prevent executives from trading in derivatives to unwind equity incentives);
Jesse Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading
Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 317-20 (1998) (citing studies that corporate insiders buy





For a social cascade to begin, the decision makers must not possess much private
information about the issue in question.235 Board members fulfill this criterion when
faced with hiring the CEO. Although boards possess a great deal of information about
CEO candidates' backgrounds and characters, this information is at best only modestly
predictive of the candidates' future performance.236 Too many uncontrollable
environmental factors affect corporate outcomes for the CEO's success to be
predictable on the basis of personal characteristics alone.237 This fact is likely to be
underappreciated or perhaps even disputed by boards for a variety of reasons,
including the illusion of control.238 As a result, when other corporations hire their
CEOs without discounting sufficiently for environmental factors, a board may do
likewise, ignoring any private information it has about the imperfect correlation
between the CEO's skills and corporate outcomes.239
This dynamic manifests most clearly in the resulting compensation package.
Recognition of the imperfect correlation between past and future performance may not
significantly alter CEO selection methods, but it should alter compensation, both in
structure and amount. The final candidates are likely to be very close in ability based
on discernible characteristics and experience.240 Nevertheless, boards may feel that the
best candidate is worth hiring even at the cost of very large premiums because tiny
differences in ability, when leveraged over an enormous corporation, may produce a
sizable improvement in performance. 241 This rationale is substantially undercut,
however, by two factors. First, there are serious questions concerning boards' abilities
to distinguish the best of such closely comparable candidates. Second, uncontrollable
environmental factors play a critical role in determining corporate outcomes and
therefore dilute the CEO's impact.242 As a result of these two factors, boards should be
reluctant to pay high premiums for small differences in talent. Yet, in part because of
the social cascade in executive compensation, boards have consistently done So.243
235. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 76.
236. See supra Part II (arguing that CEOs' past performance is insufficient to distinguish
closely comparable candidates' potential for future success).
237. See BEBCatK& FRIED, supra note 7, at 139 (citing study showing that seventy percent
of stock performance is due to general market conditions, not individual corporate
performance).
238. See supra note 212.
239. See Anderson & Holt, Classroom Games, supra note 44, at 187 (describing social
cascade experiments); see also Anderson & Holt, Information Cascades, supra note 44, at 847;
Banerjee, supra note 44, at 798; Bikhchandani et al., supra note 44, at 154; Sunstein, supra note
44, at 82 (describing social cascades).
240. See Gabaix & Landier, supra note 177, at 50 (arguing public-company CEOs are very
similar in ability, with the difference between the best and the 250th accounting for only a
.016% difference in their corporations' market capitalizations).
241. See id. (contending that even small differences in CEO candidates' abilities justify large
pay discrepancies because the CEOs' talents are leveraged across enormous corporations).
242. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 139 (citing a study showing that seventy percent
of stock performance is due to general market conditions, not individual corporate
performance).
243. See supra note 173.
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A key factor in the understanding of executive compensation as the result of a social
cascade is the role of the executive compensation consultant. Most large public
corporations engage a compensation specialist as a consultant when formulating their
officers' pay packages.244 These consultants provide a comparison study, indicating the
amount and form of compensation similar corporations pay their own CEOs. 24 1 Such
comparison studies effectively provide a report on what other similarly situated boards
of directors have done when faced with parallel compensation questions. The fact that
so many boards have made comparable decisions-to pay a large premium for the
candidate they consider most qualified-is likely to induce a board to follow the crowd
rather than investigate more deeply on its own.
"Once a cascade.., has taken hold, the resulting decision takes on the legitimacy of
the market." 246 Directors, executives, and compensation consultants who wish to argue
for alternative compensation structures would need to overcome the powerful argument
that the market has determined the traditional compensation forms are efficient.
Moreover, to compete for talented executives, corporations may have to offer the same
excessive packages offered by their peer companies.
Recent events provided a dramatic illustration of this phenomenon. When the
bankruptcy court judge presiding over United Airlines's Chapter 11 filing approved the
executives' new, very lucrative pay packages, the court responded to objections that
the executives' pay was excessive by stating: "It may be we have a culture in this
country that overcompensates management .... But United is just one enterprise that
operates in that general environment . . . . The marketplace indicates this is a
reasonable plan. 247
Whatever we may believe about CEOs' influence over boards through groupthink
(or even through managerial power), 248 that power is not very likely to extend to a
federal bankruptcy judge. Yet the presumably impartial and independent judge felt he
had to bow to the market, even though he seemed to believe that the market was
overcompensating executives. The rhetorical legitimacy of the market can be
incredibly difficult to overcome and may produce unusually stable social cascades.
C. Conclusion
Experts vigorously debate the efficiency of CEO pay packages, with some
criticizing compensation as excessive and others lauding its efficiency.2 49 Scholars who
defend the status quo generally base their argument on faith in an efficient labor
244. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 37, 70; Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the
Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive
Compensation, 30 J. CoRP. L. 255,267 (2005); Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Question-Executive
Compensation in the Era ofPayfor Performance, 75 NOTREDAMEL. REv. 271,276 n.5 (1999).
245. See Dorff, supra note 244, at 267; Yablon, supra note 244, at 276 n.5.
246. Dorff, supra note 8, at 205 1.
247. Susan Carey, Judge Approves UAL 's Managers Incentive Plan, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19,
2006, at A2.
248. Cf BEBC-.UK & FRItED, supra note 7, at 61-79 (arguing that managerial power accounts
for poorly structured executive compensation).
249. See supra note 7.
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market.25 ° Confident uncertainty should give these researchers some pause and cause
them to reflect more deeply on whether that faith is misplaced. For experts who already
believe the CEO labor market is bloated, confident uncertainty provides a powerful
explanation of the observed data.
Confident uncertainty explains excessive CEO compensation as a byproduct of
boards' undue confidence in their ability to forecast a CEO's future performance.25'
Directors experience excessive optimism about their first-choice candidate, leading
them to believe that the favored applicant merits a large premium. Their optimism
stems from a variety of sources. The illusion of validity lends unwarranted credence to
rdsumds and interviews that are only moderately predictive of future success.25 2 The
representativeness heuristic emphasizes coherence over validity and causes directors to
see candidates similar to themselves as having an outsized chance of superior
253performance. The illusion of control obscures the role of chance in determining
outcomes and lures directors into an exaggerated confidence in the CEO's abilities.
254
Cognitive dissonance and groupthink enhance this effect.255 Finally, social cascades
may boost confidence in existing evaluative methodologies beyond their actual
utility.256 The combination of all these factors yields excessive confidence in the
board's ability to select the best CEO and in that favored candidate's superiority to the
rest of the field, producing excessive compensation. In the next section, I will apply
these insights to evaluate the recent federal efforts to combat excessive compensation.
III. REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE OBAMA PLAN
A. Background
This past February, the Obama administration proposed revolutionary curbs on
executive compensation for those financial companies receiving government assistance
in response to the financial crisis.25 7 The administration was quickly followed by
Senator Dodd, who inserted additional executive pay limits into the stimulus package
250. See Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 3; Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 540; Fischel, supra
note 7, at 1259; Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent
Problem 51 ECONOMETRICA 7, 7 (1983); Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard and Observability,
10 BELL. J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979); Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that CEOs are not
overpaid); Mirrlees, supra note 7, at 105; Murphy, Top Executives, supra note 7, at 125
(suggesting that executive compensation is not excessive); Ross, supra note 7, at 134; Shavell,
supra note 7, at 55; Thomas, supra note 7, at 276; Wolfson, supra note 7, at 959 (determining
that market forces control executive compensation).
251. See supra Part II.B (applying confident uncertainty to explain the observed data).
252. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the illusion ofvalidity's impact on CEO compensation
and selection).
253. See supra Part II.B.3 (describing errors boards may make in compensating CEOs due to
the representativeness heuristic).
254. See supra Part II.B.4 (arguing that the illusion of control may result in the
overcompensation of CEOs).
255. See supra Part II.B.5-6 (contending that cognitive dissonance and groupthink may
inflate CEO pay).
256. See supra Part II.B.7 (describing the impact of social cascades on CEO compensation).
257. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2.
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which I will discuss in Part III.E, below. 25 8 More changes were made as the proposals
were translated into final regulations by the Treasury Department, which I will discuss
in Part III.F, below.2 5 9 Each of these sets of restrictions far exceeded anything
previously attempted by the federal government in this area.26 ° In light of confident
uncertainty's explanation of the root causes of excessive compensation, some of these
changes and proposals are essentially sound but require modification or expansion,
while others seem altogether ill-advised.
The Obama Plan's limits were divided into two categories. The strictest
requirements were reserved for those entities who would in the future receive
"exceptional financial recovery assistance.,, 261 Firms that took advantage only of the
262generally available capital access program would be subject to looser restrictions.
The Plan's stricter rules for those receiving exceptional assistance consisted of three
major components: (1) a cap on compensation of $500,000; (2) an exception for
restricted stock or similar incentive programs; and (3) a requirement for a "say on pay"
by shareholders.263 The more permissive limits for companies participating in widely
available relief programs were similar, but provided an additional exception to the
compensation cap. Companies that wished to pay their senior executives more than
$500,000 per year (excluding restricted stock) could do so if they fully disclosed the
compensation to shareholders and, "if requested" (presumably by the Treasury
Department), provided an opportunity for a nonbinding "say on pay" shareholder
resolution.
264
Both sets of rules in the Obama Plan would apply only to companies who received
assistance after the new rules were announced; companies the government shored up
prior to the announcement-such as Bank of America and AIG-would not have been
258. See Solomon & Maremont, supra note 29; see generally H.R. REP. No. 111-16(2009)
(Conf. Rep.).
259. See generally 31 C.F.R. § 30 (2009).
260. The most recent such efforts before the current crisis were undertaken by the Clinton
administration and are embodied in § 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 162(m)
(2006). That provision eliminated the tax deduction for executive compensation in excess of one
million dollars unless the excess compensation was performance related, for example, bonuses
or stock options. Id.
261. 31 C.F.R. § 30.1; see also Jonathan Weisman & Joann S. Lublin, Obama Lays Out
Limits on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at Al.
262. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2.
263. Id. In addition, the Obama Plan provides for "clawback" provisions for bonuses given
to top executives who engage in deceptive practices, a ban on "golden parachutes" for the top
ten senior executives (and lesser limits for other executives), and a mandate that boards of
directors adopt written policies on luxury spending and post these policies on the company web
site. Id. The clawback provisions and ban on golden parachutes are unlikely to arouse much
controversy. Even corporate leaders have praised some such provisions. See Fiorina, supra note
6. The requirement for written policies on luxury spending seems unlikely to have much
impact-companies receiving TARP money are already likely to be more sensitive to such
expenditures after the recent press coverage-but are also likely harmless. I focus here on the
provisions that are likely to prove most controversial and/or impactful.
264. See U.S. Dep't of Treasury supra note 2; Stephen Labaton & Vikas Bajaj, Executive
Pay Limits Seek to Alter Corporate Culture, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2009, at Al.
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required to comply unless they subsequently received additional assistance.265 The
rules in the Obama Plan also did not apply to companies who did not receive financial
assistance.266
Although limited in scope, the new rules were potentially revolutionary in effect. As
a result, they incited a predictable flurry of controversy.267 Critics of the plan, however,
generally assumed that executive compensation was set appropriately by a fair and
impartial market.268 None of the critics recognized the role of confident uncertainty in
creating systemic market failures that needed to be corrected. This lack of
understanding at a minimum undermines critics' argument that the labor market for
executive talent is efficient and should be left to determine pay on its own. But it also
has much to say about the means of addressing the problem.
B. Salary Cap
The heart of the Obama Plan was the salary cap. 269 A salary cap seems conceptually
very promising as a method to combat the overbidding on CEO candidates caused by
confident uncertainty. Boards are likely to amplify the disparity in expected future
performance between their first-choice CEO candidate and the other finalists.270 As a
result, they may bid too high to obtain their favored manager, reasoning that the skills
gap fully justifies the higher price. 271 As more and more companies pay extraordinary
sums for what they perceive to be the best talent, other companies may fall victim to a
social cascade that seems to justify the new compensation level.272
265. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2; Labaton & Bajaj, supra note 264 (stating
that new rules do not apply to the more than 350 institutions that have already received bailout
funds).
266. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2; Labaton & Bajaj, supra note 264 ("[T]he
toughest new rules apply only to large companies seeking government assistance to survive.").
267. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Pay Cap Debate: They Don't Go Far Enough..., WALL ST.
J., Feb. 6, 2009, at All ("[T]he guidelines are too modest and should be tightened."); Smith,
supra note 6 ("Public anger is hard to deny, but we shouldn't let it weaken an important
industry. Sensible restraints and market forces will cause the industry to reinvent itself.");
Labaton & Bajaj, supra note 264 (arguing that the new rules may discourage companies from
seeking federal assistance and may make it more difficult to recruit and retain talented
executives); Fiorina, supra note 6 ("[I]t doesn't strengthen our economy when government
decides how much each job is worth. In America we leave that job to markets.").
268. See Smith, supra note 6 (stating most Wall Street bonuses paid in 2008 were efficient
and went to those who helped make things better or were otherwise valuable to retain); Fiorina,
supra note 6 ("[It doesn't strengthen our economy when government decides how much each
job is worth. In America we leave that job to markets.").
269. As discussed below, the cap was nevertheless largely dropped from the final
regulations. See infra Part III.F.
270. See supra Part II.C (applying confident uncertainty to analyze CEO compensation).
271. See Gabaix & Landier, supra note 177, at 84 ("Substantial firm size leads to the
economics of superstars, translating small differences in ability into very large differences in
pay.").
272. See generally O'Connor, supra note 126, at 1240; Sunstein, supra note 44, at 84
(discussing the basic theory of the cascade phenomenon).
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A strict salary cap should short-circuit the resulting upward pay spiral. No matter
how talented the candidate, regardless of how much value the board believes she or he
might add to the company's bottom line, the directors may only spend the amount of
the cap. They will likely still perceive one candidate as reliably superior to the others,
but a cap would restrain directors from acting on their exaggerated perceptions. 73 A
cap would also break the social cascade.274 A statutory maximum would prevent
companies from signaling that some higher threshold is appropriate. Without some
signal that can be read and interpreted by other players as indicating the possession of
private information, social cascades can neither form nor survive. 2 75 To the extent
excessive pay is the result of confident uncertainty, a strict salary cap should prove an
effective tonic.
As critics have pointed out, however, strict caps produce many problems of their
own.276 First, any fixed cap is necessarily arbitrary.277 Why should pay be capped at
$500,000? Why not $550,000 or $1 million or $10 million? Half a million is a nice,
round number and certainly sounds like an enviable salary to most Americans, 278 but
there is no theoretical justification for choosing that particular figure. Consequently,
policy makers will have trouble defending any particular line drawn.
Second, the Obama cap applies to all senior executives at companies that have taken
government funding, regardless of the companies' size or the executives'
performance2 79 An across-the-board cap is hard to defend on either fairness or
economic grounds. Larger companies are likely to be more complex and require
273. See supra Part II.B (explaining excessive executive compensation as a consequence of
boards' excessive optimism).
274. See supra Part II.B.7 (describing the role of social cascades in producing excessive
executive compensation).
275. See Anderson & Holt, Information Cascades, supra note 44, at 847. See generally
Anderson & Holt, Classroom Games, supra note 44, at 187-92 (describing social cascade
experiments); Banerjee, supra note 44, at 798; Bikhchandani et al., supra note 44, at 151-55;
Sunstein, supra note 44, at 82-83 (describing social cascades).
276. See Valerie Bauerlein & Paulo Prada, Curbs on Executive Pay: Among Bankers,
Howls-and Cheers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at A10 (quoting a bank executive as
complaining caps set an "arbitrary standard without consideration for individual decisions"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Alex Roth & Corey Dade, Curbs on Executive Pay: Mixed
Reactions from Republicans Demonstrate the Dilemma Faced by the Party, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5,
2009, at AN0 (quoting conservative commentator Sean Hannity as describing the caps as "a
dramatic move away from capitalism and toward socialism" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Weisman & Lublin, supra note 261 (quoting a banking executive as critiquing the pay cap
because "if executives are making money for shareholders, 'they should be rewarded for it"');
Fiorina, supra note 6 (describing caps as arbitrary).
277. See Bauerlein & Prada, supra note 276 (quoting a bank executive as complaining caps
set an "arbitrary standard without consideration for individual decisions" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Fiorina, supra note 6 (describing caps as arbitrary).
278. The average income for a middle-income American family in 2006 was $45,000. Neil
Irwin & Alejandro Lazo, Inflation Hits the Poor Hardest; No Income Group Is Untouched, but
Staples Are Rising Fastest, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2008, at AO 1.
279. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2 (explaining how guidelines
distinguish between companies based on the amount of assistance they receive, not based on
their size or success).
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greater expertise to run. 28 0 The pool of executives with the necessary skill and
experience to govern larger businesses is therefore likely to be relatively small. Those
individuals who do possess the requisite skill set may justifiably expect to command
greater compensation than those who do not. An executive with the rarified ability to
run a multinational, diversified conglomerate worth hundreds of billions of dollars
simply deserves higher pay than someone whose abilities are strained by running a
much simpler, smaller company. Similarly, a CEO who guides a company to triumph
deserves to be rewarded more than a less-successful rival. Economically, wealthier
businesses should be able to translate that advantage into more talented leadership,
whether measured in sophistication or expected success.281 The Obama cap would bar
companies from leveraging their wealth to purchase the best executives.282 Without a
price mechanism that can respond to quality, talent will not be put to its most efficient
use. Executives who could run large, complex entities may instead end up running
simpler businesses because the reward for the two tasks is identical.
Third, strict compensation caps (although not the cap in the Obama Plan) fail to
align executives' incentives with shareholders' interests. 28 3 Proponents ofperformance
pay-such as bonuses, stock options, and restricted stock-argue that it provides
executives with appropriate incentives to maximize shareholder value.284 Assuming
that investors are diversified, executives should pursue shareholders' interests by
investing in projects with the greatest expected returns.285 Even ifthe associated risk of
280. This is the heart of Gabaix and Landier's argument that the rise of CEO compensation is
justified. Companies increased greatly in size and complexity at the same time that CEO pay
was increasing, and larger companies require greater executive expertise-hence a more rarified
talent pool. See Gabaix & Landier, supra note 177, at 49-50 ("[T]he model proposes that the
recent rise in CEO compensation is an efficient equilibrium response to the increase in the
market value of firms, rather than resulting from agency issues.").
281. See id. at 49 (describing model showing that best CEOs will be hired by the largest
firms, since these firms can best leverage the CEOs' impact).
282. I argue above that boards exaggerate their own ability to distinguish the best candidate
from closely comparable finalists. See supra Part 1I. Nevertheless, a fixed cap such as that in the
Obama Plan will not permit even large and easily discernible talent gaps to be rewarded, and
therefore will impede distribution of talent to the highest valuing use.
283. The Obama Plan provides for the possibility of restricted stock awards, which may be
intended to compensate for this deficit of absolute caps. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, supra note 2 ("Any pay to a senior executive of a company receiving exceptional
assistance beyond $500,000 must be made in restricted stock or other similar long-term
incentive arrangements." (emphasis in original)). I will discuss the restricted-stock component in
the next section. See infra Part III.C.
284. See Solomon & Maremont, supra note 29 (explaining how corporate-governance
experts advocate compensation packages that contain larger proportions of incentive pay, rather
than salaries).
285. See Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REv. 277, 292-93 (1990). As Henry Hu has argued:
If shareholders are diversified and the risk associated with a project can be
diversified away, managers can concentrate on expected returns and pay relatively
little attention to such "diversifiable," "unique," or "unsystematic" risk. Stated
more generally, if shareholders hold diversified portfolios (as is usually presumed
for publicly held corporations), corporate managers dedicated to acting
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these investments is high, diversified shareholders will benefit on average ifcompanies
act as risk-neutral, rational agents.286 Guaranteed fixed compensation, in contrast, may
induce executives to work toward their employer's long-term stability so that they can
preserve their positions.287 As a result, investors may suffer subpar returns from overly
safe investments.288 As applied to troubled companies receiving a large government
bailout, this aspect of fixed compensation may seem a virtue rather than a vice.
Particularly for the largest companies whose failure poses risks to the entire financial
system, the government-in contrast to shareholders-may well prefer investment in
safer enterprises despite their lower expected returns.289 But fixed compensation may
also fail to incentivize hard work the way performance-linked compensation should.290
The Obama Plan did not suffer from this particular defect since it contained an
exception for performance pay. As I argue below, however, the usual methods of
aligning pay with performance are themselves troubling.
291
One last problem with the Obama cap stemmed from its limited scope. The cap
applied only to financial companies who received government assistance after the
restrictions were announced.292 Financial companies who received aid before the new
rules were exempt unless they received further assistance. 293 These excepted entities
could offer whatever they liked to potential executives, and so would have a significant
advantage in competing with restricted companies for managerial talent.2 94 Affected
consistently with shareholder optimality should pay relatively little attention to
unsystematic risk in judging among investment alternatives.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The financial crisis demonstrated that systemic (nondiversifiable) risk
may be more common than previously appeared.
286. See id. at 299 ("[A] diversified shareholder would not want the managers of a publicly
held corporation to act in a way intended to ensure the well-being of the corporation. If
managers were to focus on the total risk of an investment project instead of the nondiversifiable
risk, for instance, they might enhance the health of the firm, but they would probably not
maximize the share price." (emphasis in original)).
287. See Hu, supra note 285, at 299.
288. See id. ("If managers were to focus on the total risk of an investment project instead of
the nondiversifiable risk... they might enhance the health of the firm, but they would probably
not maximize the share price.").
289. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2 ("[T]he compensation
committees of all companies receiving government assistance must provide an explanation of
how their senior executive compensation arrangements do not encourage excessive and
unnecessary risk-taking.").
290. See BEBcHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 121-24.
291. See infra Part III.C.
292. See Weisman & Lublin, supra note 261 ("The rules do not apply retroactively, not even
to those firms that have already been bailed out.").
293. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2 ("The measures announced
today are designed to ensure that the compensation of top executives in the financial community
is closely aligned not only with the interests of shareholders and financial institutions, but with
the taxpayers providing assistance to those companies." (emphasis added)). But see Weisman &
Lublin, supra note 261 ("But [the rules] will be imposed on all companies-in the financial,
auto or other sectors-receiving any future help.").
294. See Craig Karmin, Shareholders Renew Push to Regulate Executive Pay, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 13, 2009, at Cl ("Companies contend that current pay structures are necessary to attract
and retain talent, despite job losses on Wall Street."); Lucchetti & Kamitschnig, supra note 1
("If the government imposes caps or other limits on compensation, some bankers worry that the
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companies would have been particularly vulnerable. The market is likely to interpret
government assistance as a sign of weakness. 95 Executives may be correspondingly
reluctant to trade positions with more stable companies for slots with at-risk
businesses. Restricting these companies' ability to overcome this deficit with a
compensation-risk premium for executives may deprive weakened companies ofbadly
needed leadership.296
The Obama Plan's limited scope seemed purely a product of politics. The
motivation for the cap seemed to be to mollify the public's outrage that taxpayer funds
were used to pay large bonuses to executives whose companies were failing.297 But
these companies' problems say nothing about the market for senior executives. If
seven-figure compensation packages are necessary to attract the needed talent, then the
fact that the companies used taxpayer money to fund these expenses seems irrelevant.
Taxpayers would be unlikely to complain about funds used to build a new factory or
purchase new inventory; why should using bailout funds to purchase skilled managers
be any different? These restrictions make sense only under the assumption that the
executive labor market is not efficient and is producing excessive compensation. But
that justification is surely not limited to companies receiving Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) money or other federal assistance. If the executive labor market is
producing excessive compensation, the market failure as a whole should be addressed,
not just some subset of the financial sector.298
The salary cap as envisioned by the Obama Plan was deeply flawed. While there is
obvious political appeal to imposing compensation limits on executives who led their
companies and the country into an economic quagmire, imposing an arbitrary, across-
the-board cap on selected businesses is likely only to undermine efforts to rescue ailing
companies. 2 99 A properly designed salary cap, however, could help overcome confident
uncertainty while still avoiding many of the current plan's pitfalls. Two important
changes would greatly improve any future cap.
most talented people will flee to firms that are less regulated.").
295. This is especially true of banks' use of the Federal Reserve's discount window. See Neil
Irwin, Fed's Role in Crisis Is Giant, if Opaque, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2008, at Al.
296. The availability of restricted stock and similar incentive pay as a compensation tool may
ameliorate this effect somewhat. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2
("Any pay to a senior executive of a company receiving exceptional assistance beyond $500,000
must be made in restricted stock or other similar long-term incentive arrangements." (emphasis
in original)).
297. See Weisman & Lublin, supra note 261; see also Smith, supra note 6 (discussing the
"public outcry" at news that the securities industry paid bonuses of eighteen billion dollars in
2008). President Obama stated, in announcing the new restrictions: "This is America .... We
don't disparage wealth. We don't begrudge anybody for achieving success. And we believe
success should be rewarded. But what gets people upset-and rightfully so-are executives
being rewarded for failure, especially when those rewards are subsidized by U.S. taxpayers."
Weisman & Lublin, supra note 261.
298. The Obama Plan applies only to financial companies that receive federal assistance after
the Plan's inception. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2. But see
Weisman & Lublin, supra note 261 ("But [the rules] will be imposed on all companies-in the
financial, auto or other sectors-receiving any future help.").
299. See supra notes 276-96 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with the
current version of the salary cap).
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First, for the reasons discussed above, the cap should not be fixed across the
board.3' ° Instead, the maximum compensation should be tied to the company's
complexity and success-what I term a "tailored cap." The level of compensation will
inevitably still be arbitrary, but companies that are relatively complex and/or are
thriving should have the ability to pay their executives more than those that are simpler
or that experience less success. 30 1 The compensation level is more a question of
feasible politics than wise policy, but the compensation formula should permit for
fairly wide variance among companies on the order of four to one (such as a salary
range of $250,000 to $1 million). The range should be sufficient to permit a
functioning distributional market so that those identified (even if without perfect
accuracy) as the best executives land in the companies best able to leverage their
talents.30 2 The formula for the tailored cap could take many factors into account, but
keeping it simple is probably preferable; a complex formula is likely to be more easily
susceptible to manipulation.
30 3
One possibility would be to calculate compensation as a function of the company's
average market capitalization over a period of five years as compared to the average
market capitalization for all public companies in the industry.304 Market capitalization
is a crude measure of a company's complexity and success, but may suffice for our




"C" and "K" in this formula are constants chosen to set the compensation at the
politically desired level and could be adjusted annually for inflation. "C" represents
some minimum compensation that heads of even the smallest company could collect.
"K" is a multiplier that will determine the impact of company size. "Y" measures the
300. See supra notes 280-86 and accompanying text (arguing the fixed cap is hard to defend
on either efficiency or fairness grounds).
301. For an explanation of why this should be the case see supra notes 283-86 and
accompanying text.
302. As explained previously, companies are likely to place too much faith in their ability to
predict accurately which executives will prove most successful. See supra Part II.B.
Nevertheless, I do not see an alternative to a market mechanism for making labor distribution
decisions. As is generally true with market failures, law should intervene to curb market
excesses while still harnessing markets' power. Here I advocate-in contrast to the Obama
Plan-permitting significant spreads in compensation to allow for a market while still limiting
the upper range of pay packages to avoid the worst effects of confident uncertainty.
303. See infra notes 340-46 and accompanying text (discussing manipulation of
performance pay mechanisms).
304. To avoid manipulation of the benchmark, some government entity such as the Securities
and Excahnge Commission or the Federal Reserve should classify all public companies for this
purpose. Clearly, some unfairness would result as, for example, small, rapidly growing
companies would be included in an index that also measured the success of larger, slower-
growth entities. Similarly, conglomerates that included many different industries might be
difficult to classify. But the risks of manipulation inherent in an effort to find the most accurate
comparative benchmark clearly outweigh any benefits of greater fine-tuning.
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year, from two years previous to two years subsequent to the current year, with year
zero as the current year.30 5 "MCCy" represents the market capitalization of the
company in year "Y." "MCIy" represents the average market capitalization for
companies in the same industry in year "Y."
A five-year average like this should be much more difficult for executives to
manipulate than a single quarter's financial results, so this proposal should not suffer
from the same defects as conventional stock options.30 6 In order to better align
executives' incentives with shareholders' interests, the five-year period could include
future years as well, with some portion of compensation withheld until those years'
results are known. Basing compensation on a moving average of executive
compensation would reward, with raises, executives who succeeded in growing the
company and enriching shareholders, achieving some alignment of executives' and
shareholders' interests. Adjusting the compensation relative to the industry's
performance as a whole prevents managers from receiving rewards (or salary cuts) just
because the industry as a whole is experiencing a favorable economic climate (such as
high oil prices). 30 7 Executives should be barred from unwinding these incentive effects
through derivatives trading.
30 8
Other corporate characteristics could certainly be used in addition to or instead of
market capitalization, but to avoid the impact of confident uncertainty, the formula
should be restricted to objectively measurable criteria.30 9 Permitting boards to reward
abstract skills such as leadership would reopen the door to excessive compensation.
The second modification that should be made is to apply the compensation limits as
broadly as legally permissible under the Commerce Clause, 3t0 if possible, to all
companies, whether public or private, that do business in the United States or are listed
on a United States stock exchange.31 1 The United States should also endeavor to
305. Although this formula looks at a five-year period to determine compensation, the choice
of the relevant period is of course somewhat arbitrary. The period should be long enough to
avoid strictly short-term thinking (and the accompanying incentives to manipulate financial
results to improve this year's compensation), but still short enough so that success has a
significant impact on total pay.
306. Bebchuk and Fried have criticized conventional options in part for their susceptibility to
manipulation. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 184 ("Executives who are free to unload
shares or options may have incentives to jack up short-term stock prices by running the firm in a
way that improves short-term results at the expense of long-term value.").
307. See id. at 141-42. Bebchuk and Fried have pointed out that conventional stock options
suffer from this flaw. See id. (explaining how indexed options can help avoid the windfall
problem associated with conventional options).
308. See id. at 174-85 (explaining that conventional options generally do not prohibit
recipients from unwinding the resulting exceptions through derivatives trading).
309. If private companies are also governed by the plan, as I argue below they should be,
some other measure of total company value would have to be used, such as discounted cash flow
or earnings capitalization.
310. U.S.CONST.art. I § 8,cl. 3.
311. The United States Constitution grants power to Congress to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... Id. The
Commerce Clause has been applied broadly to permit federal regulation of corporate
governance. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,630-46 (1981) (striking down a state
antitakeover statute, in part, because it conflicted with the federal Williams Act governing
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persuade other countries to impose similar caps. Most other heavily industrialized
nations indicated their willingness to adopt such a cap, at least for financial companies,
at the G-20 meeting in September 2009.312 The G-20, which represents eighty percent
of the world's economy, was blocked by the United States and Britain from imposing a
compensation cap for bankers. 
1 3
Universal application will be politically contentious. Politicians willing to impose
compensation limits on companies receiving substantial government assistance may
balk at applying those limits across the board. For example, Senator Richard Shelby,
the senior Republican on the Senate Banking Committee, stated: "In ordinary situations
where the taxpayers' money is not involved, we shouldn't set executive pay .... But
where you've got federal money involved, taxpayers' money involved, TARP money
involved, and the way they have spent it, with no accountability, is getting close to
being criminal.
3 14
Despite the controversy universality is likely to generate, broad application of the
cap is critical to its success. If important categories of companies are excluded,
talented executives may migrate to those entities able to offer them the highest
compensation. 31 5 For some period at least, the CEOs of affected entities may feel their
reputations and future marketability-as well as some sense of responsibility for their
company's dilemma-require that they remain at the helm, even at substantially
reduced pay. A number of CEOs in similar situations have agreed to work for one
dollar per year, at least for a time, though they have often demanded equity grants as
well.316 But those senior executives below the top spot who are less visible to public
pressure may feel no such compunction. Troubled companies are poorly positioned to
weather the loss of their most seasoned executives.
These two modifications-adjusting pay for company complexity (as crudely
measured by market value) and applying the restrictions as broadly as possible-
should ameliorate most of the flaws in the Obama Plan's cap. 317 The level of pay will
remain arbitrary, but will be adjusted for the company's complexity and success,
permitting a market in senior managers. 318 By changing over time in reaction to a
company's growth, the modified cap also preserves some performance incentives for
tender offers).
312. See G-20 Addresses Bankers' Bonuses, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009, at All.
313. Id.
314. Obama Imposes Limits on Executive Pay, MSNBC.coM, Feb. 4, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.con/id/29003620/.
315. Similarly, if the cap applies only domestically, the most sought-after executives may
move to international companies free of the compensation restriction.
316. See Andrew Countryman, Reformers Chip Away at Great Wall ofPay, Ci. TRnB., May
9, 2004, at C I (noting that Apple CEO Steve Jobs accepted a one dollar per year salary, but also
took nearly seventy-five million dollars in restricted stock); Kerry E. Grace, Crisis on Wall
Street: AIG Says CEO Pay Will Be $1, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2008, at C2 (noting that AIG CEO
Edward M. Liddy agrees to work for one dollar per year, plus equity grants); Tomoeh Murakami
Tse, Congress Trumps Obama by Cuffing Bonuses for CEOs, WASH. PoST, Feb. 14, 2009, at Al
(noting that Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit agreed to an annual salary of one dollar per year
until the bank is profitable again).
317. See supra notes 279-99 and accompanying text (discussing flaws with the salary cap in
the Obama Plan).




executives, though admittedly these will be weaker than under the current unregulated
system. 319 Finally, by applying the restrictions as broadly as possible, the modified cap
should avoid subjecting affected companies to a significant talent drain.
C. Performance Pay
The Obama Plan permitted even those companies subject to the strictest limits-
those receiving "exceptional assistance"--to exceed the $500,000 cap by awarding
their senior executives restricted stock or "other similar long-term incentive
arrangements." 320 The Treasury Department's Press Release did not provide examples
of conforming compensation structures.321 Restricted stock cannot be sold until after
either: (a) the company has repaid the government in full, including contractual
dividend payments; or (b) some unspecified period has elapsed that has permitted the
government to determine the company is otherwise behaving itself.322 Presumably,
some analogous restriction would apply to arrangements that are "similar" to restricted
stock, but the Treasury Department's Press Release did not state as much expressly.
323
The restricted stock exception's vague nature makes it difficult to evaluate
concretely. Nevertheless, the clear intent of the restricted stock exception was to
anticipate critiques that the Obama Plan's regulations would prevent corporations from
providing executives incentives to maximize shareholder value and protect taxpayer
funds.324 Performance-based pay of some sort is widely considered sound
compensation practice as a method of reducing residual agency costs, especially in
publicly traded corporations where ownership is divorced from control.3 25 Guaranteed
319. The formula's incentives may also prove weaker than the restricted stock and
performance bonuses permitted under the Obama Plan. I will have more to say about pay-based
incentives in the next section. See infra Part III.C.
320. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2.
321. See id
322. See id. ("The senior executive receiving such restricted stock will only be able to cash
in either after the government has been repaid-including the contractual dividend payments
that ensure taxpayers are compensated for the time value of their money-or after a specified
period according to conditions that consider among other factors the degree a company has
satisfied repayment obligations, protected taxpayer interests or met lending and stability
standards.").
323. See id.
324. See id. ("Such a restricted stock strategy will help assure that senior executives of
companies receiving exceptional assistance have incentives aligned with both the long-term
interests of shareholders as well as minimizing the costs to taxpayers.").
325. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You
Pay, but How, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138, 138-49 (arguing for greater emphasis
on performance pay). See generally Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay
and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990) (arguing for greater emphasis on
performance pay). Agency costs can be broadly divided into three categories: bonding costs,
monitoring costs, and residual costs. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,308
(1976). Bonding costs are incurred by the agent as a method of demonstrating his or her
reliability. Id. For example, securing a law degree from a prestigious university signals that the
graduate will be a bright and well-trained lawyer. Monitoring costs are borne by the principal or
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cash compensation is generally thought to provide inadequate incentives to protect
shareholder interests.
326
I see four problems with including long-term performance incentives as an
exception to the flat cap in the Obama Plan. First and most importantly, performance
incentives open the very door to excessive compensation that a flat cap (or my
proposed tailored cap) closes.327 Boards suffering from confident uncertainty will
overstate their favored candidate's superiority to his or her competitors. As a result,
they will consent to exorbitant compensation demands they would not have to pay if
they were willing to settle for their second choice. A compensation cap (whether flat or
tailored) prevents boards from acting on their excessive confidence by depriving them
of the power to bid beyond the cap.328 But the restricted stock exception would permit
boards to overpay despite the cap on fixed compensation. The Obama Plan did not
limit the amount of restricted stock or similar incentive-based compensation that
companies could award.
3 29
This loophole is particularly troubling because the form of compensation is
contingent; executives will receive their reward only if the corporation repays its debt
or otherwise pleases the government. 330 All else being equal, executives would prefer
certain compensation to compensation they may never realize.33 1 When bargaining for
compensation in an unregulated market, executives would therefore typically
demand-and boards would generally grant-higher expected compensation to
compensate executives for taking on risk.332 Risky compensation such as stock options,
restricted stock, and performance bonuses, therefore, often results in greater overall
compensation on average than guaranteed compensation such as salaries.333
employer to detect defections by the agent. See id. Checking receipts before reimbursing
business expenses is an example of a monitoring cost. Finally, residual costs constitute costs to
the principal that result from an agent's actions that are not in the principal's interest. See id.
Employees who surf the web on company time are imposing residual costs on their employers.
326. Cf BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 7, at 122-23.
327. See supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text (arguing that a compensation cap may
prove effective in combating excessive compensation caused by confident uncertainty).
328. See supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text.
329. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2.
330. See id ("The senior executive receiving such restricted stock will only be able to cash
in either after the government has been repaid-including the contractual dividend payments
that ensure taxpayers are compensated for the time value of their money-or after a specified
period according to conditions that consider among other factors the degree a company has
satisfied repayment obligations, protected taxpayer interests or met lending and stability
standards.").
331. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Cu. L. REv. 751, 762-63
(2002) ("A firm that requires a risk-averse executive to accept risky elements of compensation
will have to provide more total compensation on an expected value basis to offset risk-bearing
costs.").
332. See id.
333. See id. at 763 ("For example, if a CEO candidate currently works for a firm that pays
her a cash salary of $500,000, another firm wishing to hire her and pay her in part with options




The last major government effort to moderate executive compensation suffered
from a similar defect, with disastrous results. The Clinton administration passed an
amendment to the Tax Code that forbade public corporations from deducting senior-
executive compensation in excess of one million dollars unless that compensation was
performance related (such as stock options or performance bonuses). 4 In response,
companies' use of stock options in compensation packages skyrocketed, as did total
pay.335 In sum, not only would the performance-pay exception unwind the benefits of
the $500,000 cap, but it would do so in a way that is especially likely to result in
excessive compensation.
The second problem with this exception is that performance-linked pay may induce
executives to manipulate financial statements or manipulate the business itself to raise
their compensation. By definition, performance pay rewards achievement. Any
achievement, however, must have a metric. The most common form of performance
pay-stock options-measures achievement with the stock price.3 36 The past few years
have demonstrated that when executives receive a large portion of their compensation
in options, they can improve their personal bottom line by timing disclosures of
information to the public; delaying or hastening capital expenditures or advertising
campaigns; or, in the most egregious cases, providing fraudulent numbers in their
financial statements. 337 But options are not the only form of performance pay
vulnerable to manipulation. Restricted stock, performance bonuses, or any other
compensation structure where pay is linked to some performance target may be
susceptible to exploitation.338 In short, performance pay seems to provide a powerful
temptation to cheat and worse, to cheat in ways that hurt the company and its
shareholders.
We certainly expect most executives will play by the rules. But incentives should be
designed to make it as difficult as possible to manipulate the results. Performance-
related pay is very difficult to design without vulnerabilities highly motivated and
intelligent executives can exploit. In addition, the underlying assumption that
334. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2006). In particular, § 162(m)(1) provides: "In the case of any
publicly held corporation, no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable
employee remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount of
such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000." Id. §
162(m)(1). Section 162(m)(4)(C) contains the exception for performance pay, "The term
'applicable employee remuneration' shall not include any remuneration payable solely on
account of the attainment of one or more performance goals." Id. § 162(m)(4)(C).
335. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 331, at 792 (attributing the large increase in
corporations' use of stock options in executive compensation package in part to the passage of §
162(m)).
336. See Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1803, 1812 (2008) ("Compensation in the
form of stock and stock options has therefore often been emphasized as a key to improved
corporate performance, and such compensation has been the most substantial component of
executive pay for well over a decade.").
337. See Bebchuck et al., supra note 331, at 317-20 (citing studies that corporate insiders
buy company stock before releasing positive information and sell before disclosing negative
information).
338. See BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 7, at 170-73 (arguing that restricted stock increases
windfalls to executives relative to conventional stock options).
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performance pay is necessary to align shareholders' and executives' interests deserves
greater examination. Most CEOs are necessarily ambitious, hardworking people who
are driven to succeed. 339 Rewarding that success may induce some to work harder, but
the raw desire to excel may suffice as an incentive.340 At a minimum, the assumption
that performance pay, especially at stratospheric levels, is necessary to persuade CEOs
to work hard or to focus on shareholders' interests deserves more empirical-and not
just theoretical--examination.34' In the meantime, if restrictions on executive pay are
to permit an incentive-based component, that component should be capped to limit the
impact of confident uncertainty.
342
The restricted-stock exception's third flaw is that whatever incentives are produced
appear to be reversible. Scholars have previously noted that employees can, through
derivatives trades, unwind the incentives created by common forms of incentive pay
such as stock options and restricted stock.343 Without regulation to prevent this
unwinding, restricted stock awards are unlikely to provide much protection to
shareholders or taxpayers. The Treasury Department Press Release provided no hint
whatsoever whether the administration intends to enact such regulation as part of its
new executive compensation rules.344 It is critical that any plan that includes expensive
rewards for performance prevents executives from executing derivatives trades that
result in rewarding them regardless of their performance.
345
339. One model of executive compensation, the "tournament model," proposes that CEO pay
is purposefully set very high to enhance competition among senior officers for the top spot. See
Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY
L.J. 1557 (2005); Lome Carmichael, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders, 14
BELL J. ECON. 251, 257 (1983); Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Michael L. Bognanno, Do Tournaments
Have Incentive Effects?, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1307, 1308-10 (1990); James A. Fairbum & James
M. Malcomson, Rewarding Performance by Promotion to a Different Job, 38 EuR. ECON. REv.
683, 684 (1994); Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum
Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. EcON. 841, 847 (1981); James M. Malcomson, Work Incentives,
Hierarchy, andInternal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. EcON. 486,487-89 (1984); Barry J. Nalebuff
& Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and
Competition, 14 BELL J. ECON. 21, 26 (1983); Mary O'Keeffe, W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 27,34 (1984).
340. 1 am currently beginning an empirical project interviewing senior officers and directors
on a variety of corporate governance topics, including this one.
341. The work that has been done in this area has looked primarily at whether cash
compensation has increased as a result of improved performance. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra
note 7, at 122-23. The correlation found has been inconsistent. See id. But the work I am calling
for here is aimed at a different question: to what extent is performance pay necessary to induce
optimal behavior? Psychological and cultural factors may well prove adequate substitutes for
financial incentives. At a minimum, the question bears further investigation.
342. For example, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters this year has "submitted
shareholder proposals to 21 TARP recipients" to limit bonuses to the executive's salary. See
Karmin, supra note 294.
343. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 174 ("Until very recently, firms have taken
surprisingly few steps to prevent or to regulate the unwinding of the incentives created by option
and restricted-stock grants.").
344. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2.
345. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 174-85 (arguing such restrictions should be
included in executive pay structures).
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Fourth and finally, restricted stock is a problematic form of incentive compensation.
As Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have cogently argued, restricted stock shares the
same performance insensitivity as stock options.34 6 Like stock options, restricted
stock's value often rises and falls for reasons having little to do with the company's
performance: changes in overall interest rates, shifts in economic growth, increases in
the money supply, variations in commodities pricing, and others. As a result, restricted
stock may reward executives for events entirely beyond their control and fail to
effectively align executives' interests with those of shareholders.
Overall, the restricted-stock exception is well-intentioned but ill-advised. Permitting
incentive pay probably loans some comfort to those accustomed to having stock
options and similar compensation structures at the center of compensation packages,
and may have purchased some corresponding political support. In the end, restricted
stock seems unlikely to provide benefits that outweigh the substantial costs of
excessive pay and perverse incentives to manipulate the timing and content of
disclosures.347 This exception should be capped or eliminated altogether and replaced
with a tailored cap, as argued above. At a minimum, the Obama administration should
restrict the affected senior executives' ability to unwind incentive arrangements
through derivatives trading.
D. "Say on Pay"
The Obama Plan required those companies receiving extraordinary assistance to
submit their executive compensation arrangements to the shareholders for a nonbinding
"[s]ay on [p]ay." 348 Those companies participating in the generally available capital
access programs did not need to submit their executive compensation for shareholder
approval unless they desired to exceed the $500,000 cap and such a vote was
"requested., 349 The Treasury Department's Press Release did not specify who may
make such a request. Presumably the Treasury Department would have had the power
to do so, but shareholders' ability to demand a vote was murky at best. The Obama
administration also did not state the reasons it might request such a vote.
350
Granting shareholders a voice on officers' pay, while in keeping with some
scholars' recent recommendations for greater shareholder power, would constitute a
radical change in corporate law.3 5 1 Executive compensation has traditionally been
346. See BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 7, at 170-73.
347. See supra notes 330-46 and accompanying text.
348. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2 ("The senior executive
compensation structure and the rationale for how compensation is tied to sound risk
management must be submitted to a non-binding shareholder resolution. There are no 'Say on
Pay' provisions in the existing programs.").
349. Id. ("Companies that participate in generally available capital access programs may
waive the $500,000 plus restricted stock rule only by disclosure of their compensation and, if
requested, a non-binding 'say on pay' shareholder resolution.") Note that these entities are also
permitted to provide senior executives with restricted stock or similar performance-sensitive
compensation above the $500,000 cap without a shareholder vote. Id.
350. See id.
351. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 675,
696-97 (2007) (arguing for greater shareholder access to the corporate ballot in board
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considered a matter of ordinary company operations and therefore strictly within the
board's purview. 5 2 Shareholders have long been barred from interfering with the
directors' management of the ordinary operations ofthe business. 353 The long-standing
policy against shareholder interference in ordinary operations is grounded in sound
policy. One of the key advantages of the corporate form is the centralization and
professionalization of management. 35 4 Shareholders in a publicly traded corporation
seldom have access to detailed knowledge about the company's operations, nor do they
often share the depth of training and experience possessed by senior executives. 355 In
the compensation context in particular, shareholders may not understand the select
labor market for senior officers and may fail to realize that princely sums are currently
de rigueur.356 As a result, shareholders may naively reject compensation packages
necessary to secure top-flight talent, inadvertently depriving the company of skilled
management expertise.
Confident uncertainty, however, indicates that a shareholder voice on compensation
decisions may prove helpful. Shareholders do not participate in the vetting process for
CEO candidates, and, therefore, should not succumb to excessive optimism to nearly
the same degree as the board. For example, because shareholders did not themselves
choose the CEO, they should not fall prey to cognitive dissonance-they have no
personal decision to defend. 357 Also, individual shareholders are less likely to be highly
conscious of other companies' compensation decisions and may therefore elude the
elections). But see Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV.
789, 791 (2007) (responding that strong boards prevent "intershareholder opportunism" and
promote "informed decisionmaking").
352. See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553 n.35 (Del. 2001) (noting board has broad
discretion to set executive compensation); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,262 n.56 (Del. 2000)
("[D]irectors have the power, authority and wide discretion to make decisions on executive
compensation.").
353. The classic case for this proposition is Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60
N.H. 85 (1880) (stating that shareholders may not appoint an agent to oversee the directors
because by statute the business of every corporation must be managed by the directors, not the
shareholders). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors .... ).
354. See Stout, supra note 351, at 792 (arguing that board governance "promot[es] ...
efficient and informed decisionmaking").
355. In fact, most shareholders are rationally apathetic. See Jens Dammann, Corporate
Ostracism: Freezing Out Controlling Shareholders, 33 J. CORP. L. 681,739 (2008) (explaining
that most shareholders' limited investment "does not justify... becom[ing] informed about
corporate matters"); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting,
96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1231 (2008) (noting the "well-studied issues of shareholders' rational
apathy").
356. See Lublin, supra note 172 (noting that median direct compensation for CEOs of top
200 U.S. corporations was $8.85 million in 2007, but Merrill Lynch's John Thain ($78.5
million), Goldman Sachs' Lloyd Blankfein ($68.5 million), Occidental Petroleum's Ray Irani
($61 million), American Express' Kenneth Chenault ($46.2 million), and Lehman Brothers'
Richard Fuld ($40 million) are among those CEOs earning much more).
357. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) ("Officers shall be chosen in such manner and shall
hold their offices for such terms as are prescribed by the bylaws or determined by the board of
directors or other governing body.").
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social cascade in executive compensation. 358 Shareholders may therefore prove a useful
bulwark against the board's tendency to exaggerate the predictability of their chosen
candidate's future performance and the directors' corresponding willingness to overpay
to secure that candidate's services.
359
This positive impact of shareholder voice, however, is likely to be severely diluted
by making the shareholder vote non-binding, as in the Obama Plan.360 Board members
may rationalize any rejection by the shareholders as demonstrating poor understanding
of the issues at stake. After all, the board has met the CEO candidates and understands
the clear superiority of its selection over the other possibilities. The shareholders have
not. The directors may reasonably feel that their fiduciary duties to the shareholders
require that they overturn the negative shareholder vote.36 In an analogous context,
boards often attempt to prevent positive shareholder votes on hostile takeover offers on
similar grounds. That is, the directors believe that in their hands, the company's stock
will eventually rise far beyond the premium being offered by the acquirer.
362
Even a binding vote, however, is unlikely to protect sufficiently against excessive
pay. Shareholders do not have an opportunity to participate in the negotiations; they
are simply given a chance to reject the final product. When presented with a much-
lauded CEO candidate and a total compensation package endorsed by the board,
shareholders seem unlikely to vote "no" in sufficient numbers to have much impact.
Sophisticated institutional shareholders-who typically make up over half of all
shareholders in a publicly traded company-seem particularly likely to follow the
directors' recommendation. 363 With their deep experience in the elite business world, it
would be difficult to avoid the reasoning that even seemingly astronomical sums are
358. See supra Part II.B.7. Institutional investors, who have professional investment
managers, are more likely to focus on issues such as executive compensation, and therefore-
rather ironically-may be more susceptible to a social cascade.
359. See supra Part II (arguing that confident uncertainty renders directors excessively
confident about their selection of the CEO and consequently results in excessive compensation).
360. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2 ("The senior executive
compensation structure and the rationale for how compensation is tied to sound risk
management must be submitted to a non-binding shareholder resolution." (emphasis added)).
Similarly, for companies not receiving exceptional financial assistance, the Obama Plan
provides, "[c]ompanies that participate in generally available capital access programs may waive
the $500,000 plus restricted stock rule only by disclosure of their compensation and, if
requested, a non-binding 'say on pay' shareholder resolution." Id. (emphasis added).
361. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) ("The directors of Delaware
corporations stand in a fiduciary relationship not only to the stockholders but also to the
corporations upon whose boards they serve.").
362. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996) (agreeing
with the board that the market value of shares may reflect their true value); Paramount
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 1989) ("[I]t is not a breach of
faith for directors to determine that the present stock market price of shares is not representative
of true value or that there may indeed be several market values for any corporation's stock.").
363. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the
Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 241, 262 (2008) ("As the twentieth century ended, institutional investors




insignificant when compared to the cost of having inadequate leadership. This
reasoning is persuasive because it is largely correct, but only if we assume that the
directors are capable of accurately evaluating the degree to which the leading candidate
is likely to outperform the other finalists. Confident uncertainty teaches us that this
assumption is deeply suspect.
3 64
Shareholder votes on pay, then, whether binding or not, seem unlikely to provide
sufficient protection against excessive pay caused by confident uncertainty. In a plan
that includes a provision for unlimited incentive pay, such as the original Obama Plan,
a shareholder vote is still advisable.365 Despite my pessimism, shareholders may
occasionally balk at some pay packages. Even though the risk of rejection is small,
even a small chance of public embarrassment may persuade boards to rethink their
initial optimistic tendencies. But a far superior policy would be to impose limits by
law, rather than relying on shareholder action to keep boards' optimism in check.366
E. The Dodd Provisions
Less than two weeks after the Obama administration announced its new restrictions,
Senator Christopher Dodd inserted his own executive pay provisions into the stimulus
package passed by Congress.367 The Dodd provisions applied retroactively to all
companies receiving TARP funds.368 Many of the provisions contained curbs similar to
those in the Obama Plan, such as those mandating a nonbinding "[s]ay on [p]ay" by
shareholders.369 In addition, the Dodd provisions prevented affected companies from
paying certain executives bonuses or incentive pay other than in restricted stock.
370
Even restricted stock awards could not exceed one-third of the executives' total annual
compensation. 371 The number of executives covered depends on the amount of TARP
money the company has received, but for companies that receive five hundred million
364. See supra Part II.B (arguing that boards may be less able to distinguish among closely
comparable candidates than they believe).
365. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2 ("Any pay to a senior
executive of a company receiving exceptional assistance beyond $500,000 must be made in
restricted stock or other similar long-term incentive arrangements." (emphasis in original)).
366. See supra Part II1.B (recommending tailored caps on compensation).
367. Solomon & Maremont, supra note 29.
368. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § I11(a)(3),
123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (2009) (defining "TARP recipient" as an entity that has received or will
receive TARP funds).
369. Both plans also contain provisions restricting golden parachutes, permitting a "claw
back" for certain past compensation, and requiring boards to adopt plans on luxury spending.
See id. § 111 123 Stat. at 516-32; see also supra note 263 (discussing these provisions in the
Obama Plan).
370. Id. § I1 l(b)(3)(D)(i), 123 Stat. at 518 (prohibiting covered entities from "paying or
accruing any bonus, retention award or incentive compensation... except that any prohibition
developed under this paragraph shall not apply to the payment of long-term restricted stock").
371. Id. § 111 (b)(3)(D)(i)(I), 123 Stat. at 518 (capping restricted stock awards at "an amount




dollars or more (the most stringent category), the restrictions covered at least the
twenty highest paid executives.372
At first glance, the Dodd provision's restriction on bonuses and restricted stock
seemed to plug an important hole in the Obama Plan. As I argued above, the Obama
Plan's authorization of unlimited restricted-stock awards greatly weakened any positive
impact from the fixed cap on compensation.373 But the Dodd provisions left open an
even more important loophole; they did not restrict total compensation. 374 Since the
Obama Plan's fixed cap applied only to financial companies who received assistance
going forward, many companies would be covered only by the Dodd provisions.375
These companies would face no limits on total compensation. For them, the Dodd
provisions would only restrict the proportion of fixed pay to incentive-based pay;
companies could still reward their executives as richly as they desired. For companies
unaffected by the Obama Plan, the Dodd provisions do little to combat confident
uncertainty or the resulting excessive compensation.
Even those entities subject to both the Obama Plan and the Dodd provisions could
elude meaningful compensation restrictions. The Dodd provisions contained an
important exception-they did not apply to bonuses mandated by contracts entered into
before February 11, 2009.376 Any executives who entered into contracts before
February 11, 2009, are still entitled to their agreed bonuses, regardless of magnitude.
Permitting many executives to circumvent the new restrictions is not only
counterproductive, it is also in tension with another term of the Dodd provisions.
Elsewhere, the Treasury Secretary was required to review compensation paid to senior
executives in the past to determine if these payments were consistent with the new
restrictions.377 Section 11 l(f)(1) provides, in relevant part:
The Secretary shall review bonuses, retention awards, and other compensation
paid to the senior executive officers... of each entity receiving TARP assistance
before the date of enactment of [the stimulus plan of 2009] to determine whether
any such payments were inconsistent with the purposes of this section or the
TARP or were otherwise contrary to the public interest.
378
372. Id. § 111 (b)(3)(D)(ii)(I), 123 Stat. at 518 ("For any financial institution that received
financial assistance provided under the TARP equal to $500,000,000 or more, the prohibition
shall apply to the senior executive officers and at least the 20 most highly-compensated
employees, or such higher number as the Secretary may determine is in the public interest with
respect to any TARP recipient."); see also id. § I11 (a)(1), 123 Stat. at 517 (defining "Senior
Executive Officer" as, in relevant part, "an individual who is 1 of the top 5 most highly paid
executives of a public company"). The Treasury Secretary is empowered to increase this number
in the public interest. See id. § I1 l(a)(1), 123 Stat. at 517-18.
373. See supra Part III.B.
374. See id. § 111, 123 Stat. at 516-20.
375. See supra note 265.
376. See § 11 l(b)(3)(D)(iii), 123 Stat. at 518. ("The prohibition required under clause (i)
shall not be construed to prohibit any bonus payment required to be paid pursuant to a written
employment contract executed on or before February 11, 2009, as such valid employment
contracts are determined by the Secretary or the designee of the Secretary.").
377. Id. § 1l(f), 115 Stat. at 520.
378. Id. § 1l(f)(1), 115 Stat. at 520.
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Section 111(0(2) permitted the Treasury Secretary to negotiate for reimbursement of
any payments found inconsistent with the other provisions of Section L".379 This
provision seemed to suggest that prior executedpayments may have been inappropriate
and should be returned. If so, why privilege mere contracts to provide payments in the
future?
The Dodd provisions will largely fail to meet their apparent goals. Because they did
not restrict total compensation, they are unlikely to moderate excessive
compensation. 380 To the extent they did impose meaningful curbs, they may induce
executive flight to companies not covered by these restrictions.381 Their scope was
broader than the Obama Plan, but still far from the comprehensive coverage necessary
to avoid talent flows to less regulated entities or industries. 382 Finally, the exception for
preexisting contracts is likely to exempt many executives and seems in conflict with the
regulatory philosophy of other provisions.
F. Treasury Regulations
On June 15, 2009, the Treasury Department issued its final regulations
implementing TARP.383 The regulations largely drop the Obama Plan's cap on total
compensation. What remains of the cap is only a safe harbor for salaries of $500,000
or less, securing automatic approval for such compensation packages. 384 Two other
changes include an exception to the Dodd amendment's bonus limitations for
commissions and the appointment of a special master to oversee executive pay of
385TARP recipients.
Dropping the cap in its current form may have been advisable. Although I have
argued an efficiently structured cap could help counter the effects of confident
uncertainty, the harm caused by the Obama Plan cap's poor structure-a fixed cap
379. Id. § 111 (f)(2), 115 Stat. at 520 ("If the Secretary makes a determination described in
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall seek to negotiate with the TARP recipient and the subject
employee for appropriate reimbursements to the Federal Government with respect to
compensation or bonuses.").
380. See supra notes 367-68 and accompanying text (arguing the absence of restrictions on
base compensation will permit executives to avoid much of the restriction's impact).
381. There is some evidence such flight has already begun. See David Gillen, The Brain
Drain Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WKI (discussing Wall Street headhunter who is
now hearing from ten times the usual number of bankers and traders looking to switch jobs).
382. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text (expressing concern that restricting
only some companies' compensation may inadvertently drain the affected businesses of
experienced and talented executives).
383. See Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate
Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28394 (interim final rules June 15, 2009) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
30).
384. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 30.1 1(a), 30.16(a)(3)(ii) (2009).
385. See id. §§ 30.1. There were many other changes, but these were the most significant.
For example, the regulations expanded the rule banning golden parachutes to include changes of
control, mandated clawbacks for an expanded pool of executives, required board compensation
committees to explain how the compensation structure discouraged inadvisable risk-taking, and
prohibited tax gross-ups for certain senior executives.
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unaffected by company size or growth and severely limited in scope-is likely to far
outweigh any benefits.
386
The new exception to the bonus limits for commissions is unlikely to have serious
policy implications. Even without such an exception, limiting bonuses to one-third of
total compensation is unlikely to prove an important restriction in the absence of a cap
on total compensation. Instead, the primary impact of the bonus limits will be to
mandate the form bonus payments must take-restricted stock. As I argued above,
restricted stock is a flawed method of aligning shareholders' and managers' interests.
387
Permitting an exception to this rule for commissions is therefore unlikely to matter
much, because even without the exception the rule is unlikely to achieve its goals.
The most opaque change in the Treasury regulations is the appointment of a new
special master (Kenneth Feinberg) to oversee executive compensation in TARP
recipients.388 The special master is tasked with ensuring firms that have received
exceptional financial assistance pay their top executives in a way that incentivizes
long-term performance and protects taxpayer interests. 389 For firms under the special
master's supervision,390 the scope of his review is quite broad: the five most senior
executives, the next twenty most highly compensated executives, and, for the structure
of compensation packages, the one hundred most highly paid employees not included
in either of the former two groups.39 1 The special master may disapprove any
compensation package he finds to be excessive, inappropriate, or designed to
encourage excessive risk taking.3 92 Taken literally, this appears to be an incredibly
broad power, one which might be used to impose de facto caps on compensation that
the Obama administration originally wanted but eventually retracted. To assuage any
concerns that the special master might act in an arbitrary or unpredictable way, the
Treasury regulations add two limits on the special master's power. The first is a safe
harbor for salaries less than $500,000, so long as any additional compensation is paid
in long-term restricted stock.393 The second is a list of "principles" the special master
must follow. These include: (1) avoiding compensation for short-term increases in firm
value that may not last; (2) permitting firms to operate competitively in the
marketplace; (3) ensuring an appropriate allocation of compensation among short-term
pay, long-term pay, and provisions for retirement; (4) providing metrics for both
individual and firm performance; (5) establishing pay that is similar to that at
comparable firms for analogous positions; and (6) assuring that pay reflects employees'
current or expected contributions to the firm.
394
386. See supra Part III.B.
387. See supra text accompanying note 347.
388. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 30.11,30.16; Justin Fox, The Pay Crackdown, TIME, Aug. 10,2009 at
40.
389. See id. § 30.16.
390. The seven firms include the American International Group, Bank of America, Citigroup,
Chrysler, General Motors, GMAC and Chrysler Financial. See Louise Story, Who Gets Paid
What, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at Bl.
391. 31 C.F.R. § 30.16.
392. Id.
393. See id.§§ 30.11(a), 30.16(a)(3)(ii).
394. See id. § 30.16(b).
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The employees who most interest us will not be able to avail themselves of the safe
harbor, for the simple reason that they will demand pay far in excess of the cap. At
least 2500 employees of large investment banks made over $2.5 million each in
2008. 395 These employees can turn only to the "principles" to predict what sort of pay
packages the special master will approve. But as is immediately apparent, the
principles provide no meaningful guidance as to either amount or structure of
compensation.
Imagine, for example, a financial services firm wishes to pay $400,000 in salary
plus a guaranteed bonus of $1.5 million. Suppose further that this reflects the typical
compensation package similar firms pay comparable employees. Even if the
guaranteed bonus does not count as a "salary," the safe harbor is clearly unavailable
since the bonus will be paid in cash, not restricted stock. The employer therefore must
turn to the principles to predict whether the special master will permit this employment
contract.
The first principle forbids compensation that rewards employees for short-term,
temporary increases in firm value and requires that payments be made "over a time
horizon that [reflects] the risk horizon." 396 This package most likely violates the first
principle, since all of the pay is due immediately upon performance. Similarly, the
package likely violates the fourth principle, which requires that compensation reflect
metrics for individual and firm performance. The first and fourth principles
substantially overlap because the first requires payment over time that reflects risk to
better measure the employee's contribution to the firm, and the fourth also requires
payments that reflect the employee's contribution. It would seem, then, that this
package would fail both the first and fourth principles.
What about the second principle? Does this package enable the firm to perform in
the marketplace? If the package enables the firm to secure the employee it wants, then
it does; otherwise, it does not.3 97 This second principle essentially seems to argue for
permitting employees to be paid whatever firms say they must to gain their services.
The fifth principle seems to articulate much the same goal-it permits firms to pay
what the market demands for talent.39 8 Again, we seem to have one principle here, not
two, but both seem met by this package under our assumption that the package is
typical for employers such as ours.
The third principle requires an appropriate allocation between long-term and short-
term pay.399 This principle also overlaps with the first and fourth principles, since all
three seem aimed at requiring firms to structure incentives to motivate long-term
performance. Our package allocates everything to short-term pay, which would seem to
fail the third principle.
The sixth principle asks about the employee's expected contribution.400 Since the
firm is willing to pay the amount of the package under review, it clearly has already
determined that the employee's expected contribution is worth the cost. On what basis
395. See Justin Fox, Pay Them Less? Hell, Yes, TIME, Mar. 2, 2009, at 30, 30 (saying the
actual figure may be much higher).
396. See 31 C.F.R. § 30.16(b)(l)(i).
397. See id. §30.16(b)(ii).
398. See id. § 30.16(b)(v).
399. See id. §30.16(b)(iii).
400. See id. § 30.16(b)(vi).
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would the special master, whose knowledge of the firm's business is inferior to the
firm's managers, argue with the firm's determination? That similar employees are paid
less at comparable firms? But then we are simply repeating principles two and five
(and surely one principle would be enough for this point; we do not need three
principles to say the same thing).
This example should be a simple, straightforward case. Yet the results of the special
master's review under these six (two?) principles is far from clear. We have a
compensation package which by assumption passes the second, fifth, and sixth
principles, since it is the type and amount of compensation generally paid by similar
firms to comparable employees. At the same time, the package would fail those
principles if modified to allocate a significant portion of the total compensation to
performance pay or long-term pay. But without such modifications, the package flunks
the first, third, and fourth principles. What will the special master do with this
package?
Without meaningful guidance or limits restricting his behavior, the special master's
impact is unpredictable. He could impose meaningful reforms, rubber-stamp the firms'
existing practices, or act in a random, arbitrary manner. The only clear product of the
establishment of the special master is the introduction of a great deal of uncertainty
among the affected firms.
The expressed goals of executive compensation reform were to lower the amount of
compensation and to restructure compensation to reduce employees' incentives to take
excessive risks.40 1 The new Treasury regulations implementing the Obama Plan and the
Recovery Act (including the Dodd Amendments) seem likely to fail at both goals.
Without the Obama Plan's cap, the only remaining constraint on compensation is the
threat of rejection by the special master. Given the amorphous nature of the special
master's guiding principles, the likely impact of this constraint is murky. The special
master could establish clear rules requiring a reduction in compensation, but as of this
writing has failed to do so. The most powerful changes the regulations enact in the
structure of compensation are the requirements that bonuses be limited as a portion of
total compensation and be paid in restricted stock. Limiting the proportion of
performance pay may reduce employees' incentives to take risks, but may
commensurately reduce the alignment between employees' incentives and those of the
firms' owners (now primarily the U.S. taxpayers). The requirement to pay bonuses in
restricted stock is similarly misguided. As explained above, restricted stock is a
relatively poor incentive alignment mechanism. 4 2 Better methods of incentivizing
employees to act in shareholders' interests exist, such as my proposed tailored cap.
401. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2 ("These measures are
designed to ensure that public funds are directed only toward the public interest in strengthening
our economy by stabilizing our financial system and not toward inappropriate private gain. The
measures announced today are designed to ensure that the compensation of top executives in the
financial community is closely aligned not only with the interests of shareholders and financial
institutions, but with the taxpayers providing assistance to those companies.").




The core source of excessive compensation is directors' unwarranted confidence in
their ability to forecast officers' future performance.4 °3 This explanation provides
useful insights in evaluating the current federal efforts to reform executive
compensation. In particular, confident uncertainty teaches us that some sort of
compensation cap would be wise, but it should be tailored to individual corporate
circumstances. 404 The cap also should be applied as broadly as possible, not limited to
financial companies receiving federal assistance going forward as the Obama Plan's
cap is. 405 Any incentive-pay component of compensation packages should similarly be
capped, but without the loopholes supplied by the Dodd provisions and Treasury
regulations.40 6 Finally, shareholder "[s]ay on [p]ay" requirements have some potential
to rein in excessive compensation. To maximize their impact, the shareholder vote
should be binding on the corporation, not advisory.407
403. See supra Part II.
404. See supra Part III.B.
405. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 2 (guidelines apply to
"financial institutions that are receiving government assistance to address our current financial
crisis").
406. See supra Parts III.C, III.E.
407. See supra Part III.D.
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